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Innovation and Own Prior Art
AMY R. MOTOMURA†
This Article analyzes a conflict between innovation and the patent system: innovation is a
dynamic, iterative process, but a patent reflects only a single snapshot in time. Despite extensive
scholarly and judicial discussion of when an invention is ready for patenting, there is rarely a
perfect time to file a patent application. Instead of filing a single perfect application, companies
and others engaged in innovation typically build a portfolio of patents by filing a series of
applications over the course of research and development. Yet this is an imperfect strategy
because each patent application sets up a potential barrier for an innovator’s future applications.
The barrier arises because future applications must be both new and nonobvious as compared to
most of the innovator’s existing patent applications.
This Article examines the interaction between patent applicants’ own earlier-filed applications
and patentability requirements. This interaction shapes how innovators seek patent rights, and it
affects disclosure and innovation. Despite its significance, the legal treatment of successive patent
filings by the same innovator developed haphazardly. The resulting statutory framework, built by
the layering of various provisions, is not well-tailored to the original policy goals. Moreover, in
its current form, the law has unintended effects that can hamper innovation. This Article proposes
a statutory amendment that would provide a better mechanism for directly tailoring the statutory
framework, and it illustrates how its parameters can be adjusted to reflect the balancing of
competing concerns.

† Associate Professor, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. I would like to thank Hank Greely, Donald
Harris, Camilla Hrdy, Justin Hughes, Dmitry Karshtedt, Mark Lemley, Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Alix Rogers,
and Rebecca Wolitz for feedback on drafts, and Colleen Chien, Zahr Said, Yanbai Andrea Wang, and
participants at the 2018 Intellectual Property Scholars Conference for early discussions about this project.
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INTRODUCTION
In contrast to the fabled “Eureka!” moment, innovation is more commonly
a drawn-out, iterative process. Even when an innovation as a whole is
pioneering, it may be achieved not in a flash of genius, but rather through a series
of carefully planned steps forward.1 And once the outlines of an invention are
clear, making an idea actually work in practice takes time and effort; the “best”
version is usually the result of a series of refinements. But one of the key legal
mechanisms for protecting the result of innovation—a patent—reflects only a
single snapshot in time.2 The content of a patent application cannot be changed
after filing,3 and much of patent law hinges on the particular date on which the
application was filed.4 Moreover, various aspects of patent law discourage an
inventor from waiting to file a patent application until the innovation process is
complete. Indeed, patent law often pushes an inventor to file well before this.5
As a result, patents are in most cases an inherently imperfect mechanism
for disclosing and protecting innovation. Others have identified and discussed
variations of this problem, particularly by considering the optimal moment in
the innovation process that balances this tension.6 But the fundamental problem
remains that even the optimal moment to file a patent application will rarely be
a perfect one.
The practical result of this tension between innovation and the patent
system is that companies and others engaged in research and development
typically rely not on a single patent, but rather on a series of patents filed over
time.7 This approach allows companies to account for innovation trajectories,
not only in the narrow sense of iterative improvements to a particular invention,
1. In re Bass, 474 F.2d 1276, 1304 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (Baldwin, J., concurring); see Ted Sichelman,
Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 347–54 (2010).
2. Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Disclosures and Time, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1459, 1460 (2016); see Jeanne
C. Fromer, Dynamic Patent Disclosure, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1715, 1716–22 (2016).
3. See 35 U.S.C. § 132(a) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 1.53(b) (2018). The claims can be changed after filing but
only within the bounds of what was originally disclosed. See Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d
1473, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Tun-Jen Chiang, Fixing Patent Boundaries, 108 MICH. L. REV. 523, 534–36 (2010).
Nonsubstantive changes to the specification and figures are permitted.
4. See Holbrook, supra note 2, at 1468–81. This is particularly true after the transition to a first-to-file
system in 2013 with implementation of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”). See id. at 1471–73;
Robert P. Merges, Priority and Novelty under the AIA, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1023, 1024 (2012).
5. See infra notes 23–29 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 65
(2009); Paul R. Gugliuzza, Early Filing and Functional Claiming, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1223 (2016); Dmitry
Karshtedt, The Completeness Requirement in Patent Law, 56 B.C. L. REV. 949 (2015); Mark A. Lemley, Ready
for Patenting, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1171 (2016); Dotan Oliar & James Y. Stern, Right on Time: First Possession in
Property and Intellectual Property, 99 B.U. L. REV. 395 (2019); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Pierson, Peer Review,
and Patent Law, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1825 (2016); see also Fromer, supra note 2 (discussing the limitations of
“early and static” patent disclosure and arguing for post-filing disclosure of patentees’ and licensees’ covered
commercialized products). Considerations of this tension sometimes focus (with more or less emphasis) on the
effects of timing on the balance of rights between multiple parties.
7. Cf. Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 27–43 (2005)
(discussing patent portfolios and their benefits, including benefits for a firm’s subsequent innovation due to
broader scope of protection).

February 2021]

INNOVATION AND OWN PRIOR ART

569

but also to track interrelated research and development projects with different
but overlapping timelines.
But relying on a series of patents over time is an imperfect solution.
Innovators face constraints in using successive patents to track innovation.
Although there is no formal barrier to filing new patent applications as frequently
as desired, innovators are unlikely to successfully obtain patent rights from all
of these filings. This is because patent law enforces a certain amount of spacing
between patent rights—that is, each set of patent rights must typically be
sufficiently different from the last. Suppose that a company files a first patent
application on an invention and then makes improvements to the invention. If
the improved invention is too similar to the original one, the company may not
be able to patent the improvements, even when those improvements are
important—for example, they make the invention commercially successful or
fix a problem discovered in the original design.
The doctrinal basis for this spacing between patent rights originates from
the requirement that patentable inventions be not only new but also
“nonobvious.”8 The nonobviousness requirement has been described as “the
cornerstone of the patent bargain” and “indispensable for maintaining an optimal
balance between incentivizing new innovation and providing public access to
existing innovation.”9 That is, patents are designed to protect—and thus
promote—only innovation that is different enough from what came before it that
its benefit to society outweighs the social cost of exclusivity. The
nonobviousness doctrine sets the boundary between what is sufficiently different
to merit patent protection and what is not.10 This prevents the patent system from
channeling innovation incentives toward trivial inventions.11
Without the nonobviousness doctrine, different patentees would each be
able to obtain rights to slight modifications of the same invention. The
requirement that patentable inventions be “novel” similarly prevents different
patentees from each obtaining rights to the same invention. Without these
patentability requirements, many similar patent rights could be held by many
different patentees, and as such it would be difficult to navigate these rights in

8. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2018). This Article focuses on U.S. patent law, but a requirement similar to
nonobviousness is present in nearly every country’s patent laws. See John F. Duffy, Inventing Invention: A Case
Study of Legal Innovation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2007).
9. Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña & Ryan Whalen, A Network Theory of Patentability, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 63,
63–65 (2020); see also Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Law Viewed Through an Evidentiary Lens: The
“Suggestion Test” as a Rule of Evidence, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1517, 1526 (2006) (“[The nonobviousness
doctrine’s] effective and proper enforcement is crucial to maintaining the social cost-benefit balance the patent
system attempts to implement.”); ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND
POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 608 (6th ed. 2013).
10. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 9, at 608; Cotropia, supra note 9, at 1524; Pedraza-Fariña & Whalen,
supra note 9, at 65.
11. Cf. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 9, at 609 (describing that “granting patents to obvious developments
may compromise the incentives that the patent system provides to develop nonobvious inventions”).
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order to bring an invention to market. Thus, these thickets would hinder rather
than promote innovation.12
But this theoretical basis for the patentability requirements is based on a
scenario in which there are two different patentees. In the context of a single
patentee, the considerations are different and complex.13 One of the effects of
these patentability requirements as applied to a single patentee is a limitation on
the ability to obtain a series of patent rights tracking the innovation process.
To account for the particular considerations in the case of a single patentee,
the Patent Act14 has been amended over time to include provisions giving limited
preferential treatment to original patent applicants when they file patent
applications on later improvements.15 This preferential treatment allows the
original applicant to patent otherwise unpatentable innovation. This is a notable
exception to two basic principles of patent law: that the “right to patent
improvements on a technology is a common right”16 and that slight variations of
inventions already described in patents are dedicated to the public domain.17
This Article sets out the first in-depth analysis of the law that creates this
preferential treatment, and more broadly, its effects on innovation and
disclosure. These effects are pervasive and complex, and they shape patent
applicant strategy. Yet, their scholarly analysis is limited,18 likely in part because
12. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 9, at 609–10; Pedraza-Fariña & Whalen, supra note 9, at 65.
13. John Duffy has said that improvement patents granted to “a pioneer patentee may present issues
different from the canonical situation in which many similarly situated inventors are seeking patents conferring
immediate market exclusivity,” and have “unique aspects” that “seem sufficiently great as to demand more
detailed treatment.” John F. Duffy, A Timing Approach to Patentability, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 343, 366
(2008).
14. 35 U.S.C. (2018).
15. Inventors or entities applying for patents are termed “applicants.” See 37 C.F.R. § 1.42 (2018). This is
new under the AIA; previously, only inventors could be “applicants” for U.S. patents. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.41
(2010). As Parts II and IV describe, the preferential treatment discussed in this Article is not based on the identity
of the “applicant” in a strict sense. However, for lack of a better term, this Article uses “original patent applicant”
or “original applicant” throughout.
16. John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 488 (2004).
17. See Pedraza-Fariña & Whalen, supra note 9, at 63, 65 (“Patent law is built upon a fundamental premise:
only significant inventions receive patent protection while minor improvements remain in the public domain.”);
see also MARTIN J. ADELMAN, RANDALL R. RADER & JOHN R. THOMAS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT
LAW 307 (5th ed. 2019) (describing that the nonobviousness doctrine “creates a ‘patent-free’ zone around the
state of the art”); Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L.
REV. 989, 1008 (1997) (describing “minor improvers” as others whose improvements are too small to be
patentable as compared to the original patent owner).
18. There is some discussion of this preferential treatment in the literature on “secret prior art,” since the
preferential treatment is an exception to the general rule that an earlier-filed (“secret”) and subsequently
published patent application is retroactively effective as prior art as of its filing date. There, the preferential
treatment has been referred to as a limitation on “self-collision.” See, e.g., Kate H. Murashige, The Hilmer
Doctrine, Self-Collision, Novelty and the Definition of Prior Art, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 549, 556–57 (1993);
C. Douglass Thomas, Secret Prior Art—Get Your Priorities Straight!, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 147, 160–64 (1996).
I have identified three instances of scholars touching on the theory or strategic role of the particular
preferential treatment upon which this Article focuses. See Duffy, supra note 8, at 16 (discussing the
nonobviousness requirement’s role in allocating rewards among inventors, and how if both applications are
owned by a single entity, the earlier application is not prior art for obviousness analysis because “[t]he same
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they operate in the background to influence patent applicant behavior with little
external evidence.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I discusses the difficulty of
mapping innovation processes to the patent system and sets forth a taxonomy of
the types of innovation that cannot be easily captured. Part I also situates this
Article within related scholarship. Part II analyzes how preferential treatment
for original patent applicants developed piecemeal over time through targeted
amendments in response to this mapping problem, as well as through
amendments to seemingly unrelated portions of the Patent Act. Part III then
explores and evaluates the effects of preferential treatment. In particular, I argue
that preferential treatment can promote certain disclosure and innovation.
Part IV begins by describing today’s complex statutory framework for
preferential treatment and the limitations of that framework. Part IV concludes
by offering an alternative approach.

I. MAPPING INNOVATION ONTO PATENTS
A. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF A SINGLE PATENT
Innovation is rarely a simple process. Transforming an initial idea into a
completed, perfected, or commercially viable invention often involves long
timelines, many iterations, and extensive collaboration.19 James Dyson, for
example, has written that creation of his bag-less vacuum cleaner took 5,127
prototypes and fifteen years.20 He describes his company as “develop[ing]
party will receive the rewards from both patents in such cases, so allocating rewards among parties is not a
concern. The law thus eliminates the nonobviousness requirement in those circumstances and allows the granting
of patents, provided that at least mere novelty exists over the prior commonly owned invention.”); Douglas L.
Rogers, Double Patenting: Follow-on Pharmaceutical Patents that Suppress Competition, 14 NW. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 317, 375–79 (2017) (arguing that double patenting doctrine should be expanded to prevent the
same inventor or employer from patenting a species within the scope of its existing genus patent, and discussing
how this can compensate for the expanded exceptions to prior art under the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act);
Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 TEX. L. REV. 503, 522 n.98
(2009) (describing that researchers who submit an original patent application rejected by the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) for lacking utility can, unlike a different set of researchers, file another application
with additional evidence of utility within twelve months of publication of the original application).
Scholarship on obviousness-type double patenting is also related to the preferential treatment I consider
here. See, e.g., Emily A. Evans & Jill A. Jacobson, Double Patenting Recapitulated, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC’Y 625 (2005); Christopher M. Holman, The Federal Circuit’s Ongoing Expansion of ObviousnessType Double Patenting Creates Patent Prosecution Pitfalls, 33 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 94 (2014); Daniel
Kazhdan, Obviousness-Type Double Patenting: Why It Exists and When It Applies, 53 AKRON L. REV. 1017
(2019). Obviousness-type double patenting doctrine also addresses the conditions under which a patentee can
have two patents claiming obvious variants of an invention. It is, however, a special limitation on original patent
applicants’ ability to obtain patents, even when those patents are not unpatentable under the novelty and
nonobviousness requirements.
19. See Sichelman, supra note 1, at 347–54 (describing the many steps in a “stylized overview of the
innovation path from conception to a marketable good”).
20. James Dyson, No Innovator’s Dilemma Here: In Praise of Failure, WIRED (Apr. 8, 2011, 8:00 PM),
https://www.wired.com/2011/04/in-praise-of-failure/; see also How I Built This with Guy Raz, Dyson: James
Dyson, NPR (Feb. 12, 2018, 12:01 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/03/26/584331881/dyson-james-dyson.
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technology iteratively—making the smallest changes, building prototype after
prototype until we have got it as close to perfect as we can muster. Testing and
prototyping is at the heart of the most successful technologies.”21 This is true
across industries; in pharmaceutical innovation, for example, drug discovery and
pre-clinical testing of compounds take on average six and a half years, and this
process usually involves numerous research teams building upon each other’s
work.22
Innovation that happens in this way cannot be easily captured by a single
patent application. It is usually unreasonable to expect a patent applicant to wait
for the completion of the innovation process to file for a patent. This is because
the patent system permits, incentivizes, and sometimes forces inventors to file
before its completion.23
The patent system permits early filing because inventors do not need to
have actually made the invention (“actual reduction to practice”) at the time of
filing, nor do they need to know that the invention works. They must only
“constructively reduce to practice” their invention by describing it in the patent
application.24
The patent system also incentivizes early filing by providing an advantage
to earlier filers.25 This is particularly true after the transition to a first-to-file
system in the United States in 2013, which makes patentability a function of the
date on which the application was filed.26
Finally, activities in the normal course of innovation may force applicants
to file before the end of the innovation process. Certain activities can render an
invention unpatentable unless a patent application is filed within the following
year.27 For example, clinical trial activities, grant proposals, and discussions
with potential investors can create enough risk of starting this one-year clock
that cautious applicants will file before it expires.28

21. Stephen Dowling, Frustration and Failure Fuel Dyson’s Success, BBC: FUTURE (Mar. 13, 2013),
https://www.bbc.com/future/story/20130312-failure-is-the-best-medicine.
22. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-07-49, NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT: SCIENCE, BUSINESS ,
REGULATORY, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES CITED AS HAMPERING DRUG DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS 6
(2006), https://www.gao.gov/assets/260/253726.pdf.
23. See Cotropia, supra note 6, at 72–82; Lemley, supra note 6, at 1172–85.
24. Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Cotropia, supra note 6, at 69–70, 73–75;
Lemley, supra note 6, at 1177–78; Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 621, 628–30 (2010).
25. See Cotropia, supra note 6, at 78–80; Lemley, supra note 6, at 1179.
26. See Lemley, supra note 6, at 1180–82; Merges, supra note 4, at 1024.
27. Cf. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2018).
28. Cf. Janet Freilich, Prophetic Patents, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 663, 685 (2019) (describing that whether
clinical trials involve public disclosure is a “particularly contentious issue,” and that “[t]hough appropriate
confidentiality agreements can prevent clinical trials of a drug from blocking later patenting of the drug, it is a
sufficiently problematic issue that the question is frequently litigated”); Brenda M. Simon, Patents, Information,
and Innovation, 85 BROOK. L. REV. 727, 765 (2020) (describing the importance of having patents on file for
self-revealing inventions before disclosing them to investors to avoid expropriation and the risk of “likely
los[ing] the ability to obtain patent protection later”); E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Cetus Corp., No. C-89-
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The result is that an applicant’s first-filed patent application will typically
fail to reflect a large portion of the innovation process.29 Yet, once the patent
application is filed, its content cannot be updated to describe new
developments.30 New developments can be described in a new patent
application, but not in the original one.31
A number of scholars have addressed the difficulty of mapping innovation
onto a single patent application. Some of these scholars consider the optimal
timing for the application to be filed, and how patent practices or doctrines can
be adjusted to achieve this timing.32 Many have critiqued the current system for
both allowing and encouraging innovators to file too early, reducing patents’
socially beneficial functions.33 Some have proposed reforms to push inventors
to file later in the innovation process, including new or heightened patentability
or disclosure requirements or better enforcement of current requirements.34
2860 MHP, 1990 WL 305551, at *8 n.7 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 1990) (suggesting that a National Science Foundation
grant proposal was a “printed publication” under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)).
Applicants interested in patent protection outside the United States will usually file before the potential
disclosure, rather than relying on the one-year grace period, because many foreign patent laws do not provide a
grace period. See Merges, supra note 4, at 1046 (“[T]he AIA diverges from the international norm which
approximates an ‘absolute novelty’ standard.”); see, e.g., Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 54,
Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199 (“(1) An invention shall be considered to be new if it does not form part of the
state of the art. (2) The state of the art shall be held to comprise everything made available to the public . . . before
the date of filing of the European patent application.”).
29. See Dan L. Burk, Patent Silences, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1603, 1621–22 (2016); Colleen V. Chien,
Contextualizing Patent Disclosure, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1849, 1852 (2016); Cotropia, supra note 6, at 88–96;
Fromer, supra note 2, at 1715–16; Sichelman, supra note 1, at 355–56.
30. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
31. Patent law does provide a type of application that is in between an original and new patent application:
a “continuation-in-part.” A continuation-in-part is an application that adds additional disclosure to an earlierfiled application (the so-called “parent” application). In re Wertheim, 646 F.2d 527, 536 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
Despite the nomenclature, claims based on the additional disclosure in a continuation-in-part are treated no
differently than an entirely new application when patentability is assessed. Cf. Litton Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool
Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1438 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“New matter in a C-I-P application has the filing date of that C-IP application. The earlier filing date of the parent application pertains to material in the C-I-P application also
disclosed in the prior application.”); see also Robert Paradiso & Elizabeth Pietrowski, Think Twice Before Filing
that CIP Application, 196 N.J. L.J. 1, 1–2 (2009); Catherine M. Polizzi, Kicking the CIP Habit: The Perils of
Continuation-In-Part Practice, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Feb. 2006, at 10, 10–12. Nonetheless, applicants often
file continuations-in-part to disclose subject matter that builds upon their existing patent applications, and some
applicants—and even some patent practitioners—believe that such filings avoid the parent applications as prior
art. See Paradiso & Pietrowski, supra, at 2; Polizzi, supra, at 11–12.
32. See, e.g., Cotropia, supra note 6, at 119–28 (proposing requiring actual reduction to practice before
examination); Karshtedt, supra note 6, at 992–1013 (proposing codifying a “completeness” requirement for
patentability); Lemley, supra note 6, at 1191–95 (suggesting several ways to correct patent law’s increasing bias
“towards encouraging ideas at the expense of those who take the time to develop and test their inventions”);
Ouellette, supra note 6, at 1842–47 (arguing for experimenting with a peer review system to help patent
examiners assess whether the enablement requirement is met); Seymore, supra note 24, at 621, 641–57
(proposing “a new examination protocol which gives the U.S. Patent Office the ability to request working
examples when the disclosure’s teaching appears dubious,” effectively requiring actual reduction to practice for
complex inventions).
33. See, e.g., Cotropia, supra note 6, at 72–82, 87–119; Fromer, supra note 2, at 1716–21; Lemley, supra
note 6, at 1180–91; Ouellette, supra note 6, at 1826–36; Seymore, supra note 24, at 628–32.
34. See supra note 32.
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Other scholars propose reforms to promote disclosure of new developments after
a patent application is filed. Scholars have suggested, for example, encouraging
updates to include the results of experiments,35 requiring patentees and licensees
to disclose information about commercialized products covered by the
patentees’ patents,36 and encouraging patent applicants to disclose experimental
failure.37
This scholarship focuses on optimizing a single patent application’s ability
to capture dynamic innovation. In contrast, when scholars consider the
alternative approach of an innovator using multiple patent applications to
capture innovation, that approach is often described as undesirable, and even a
result of improper behavior.38 Some scholarship suggests that filing multiple
applications is a symptom of patent applicants filing too early in the innovation
process.39 Other scholarship raises concerns about follow-on patents for
pharmaceuticals, which can result in patents on small, and sometimes clinically
insignificant, variations in order to extend patent protection and delay generic
versions.40 Others critique companies’ extensive patenting driven by the
strategic value of a large portfolio (not by the value of any particular patent) and
argue that this creates patent thickets that hurt innovation.41
All of these concerns are worth raising. But applicants seeking multiple
patents during the course of innovation are often acting neither frivolously nor
improperly. Any applicant pursuing patent protection must make hard decisions
about when to file one or more patent applications and what to include in those
applications. This is particularly true when research and development includes

35. See Freilich, supra note 28, at 722–23 (proposing “creating a mechanism to encourage updating of
hypothetical examples”).
36. See Fromer, supra note 2, at 1722–31 (“Whenever a patentee or a licensee releases a new product or
version of an existing product that the patentee perceives, or should perceive, to be covered by one or more of
the patentee’s patents, the patentee would have a legal obligation to file information expeditiously with the Patent
and Trademark Office . . . on the existence of the commercialized product and its coverage by the relevant
patents. The PTO would make this information available to the public, linking it directly to the relevant
patents.”).
37. See Sean B. Seymore, Patenting Around Failure, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1139, 1177–86 (2018) (proposing
disclosure of experimental failures in applications’ prosecution histories and discussing strategies for
incentivizing this disclosure).
38. But cf. Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 7, at 27–43 (discussing the value of patent portfolios,
including “eas[ing] subsequent in-house innovation” and “adjust[ing] for changing technology as [a firm]
attempts to navigate the path of a research and development effort”).
39. See, e.g., Cotropia, supra note 6, at 69, 96–97, 101, 103.
40. See, e.g., Robin Feldman, May Your Drug Price Be Evergreen, 5 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 590 (2018);
Aaron S. Kesselheim, Michael A. Fischer & Jerry Avorn, Extensions of Intellectual Property Rights and Delayed
Adoption of Generic Drugs: Effects on Medicaid Spending, 25 HEALTH AFFS. 1637, 1638, 1643 (2006). But see
Christopher M. Holman, Timo Minssen & Eric M. Solovy, Patentability Standards for Follow-On
Pharmaceutical Innovation, 37 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 131, 137–39 (2018) (arguing that “the concern over
such so-called evergreening is . . . to a large extent illusory”).
41. See, e.g., Gregory R. Day & W. Michael Schuster, Patent Inequality, 71 ALA. L. REV. 115 (2019)
(arguing that powerful firms with large patent portfolios hurt innovation, and surveying other scholarship in this
area).
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a web of interrelated projects with overlapping and shifting scope as well as
different, often unpredictable, timelines.
B. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF MULTIPLE PATENTS
Although the realities of research and development often push applicants
to rely on multiple patent applications, this strategy also has its limitations.
When innovation that happens after the filing of an initial patent application—
what this Article refers to as “post-filing innovation”—is sufficiently different
from what is described in the initial application to be novel and nonobvious in
comparison, multiple patent applications are a reasonable strategy for capturing
that innovation.
A more complex situation arises when post-filing innovation is not
sufficiently different. As a general rule, slight variations of inventions already
described in patents are dedicated to the public domain.42 This means that,
without an exception to that general rule, an innovator’s initial patent application
can prevent the innovator from patenting certain post-filing innovation. This
Article refers to this unpatentable post-filing innovation as “supplementary
innovation.” Supplementary innovation often includes the small steps that
characterize much of day-to-day research and development; the Subparts that
follow provide examples of supplementary innovation and suggest a taxonomy
with three dimensions.
1. Minor and Deepening Supplementary Innovation
The first of these dimensions relates to the statutory basis for
supplementary innovation’s unpatentability. Some supplementary innovation is
different from what is described in an original applicant’s existing patent
application, but not sufficiently different to be nonobvious in comparison. This
Article terms this kind of innovation “minor” supplementary innovation.43 Other
supplementary innovation is different from what is described in an existing
patent application, yet is rendered not novel (“anticipated”) by it. This Article
terms this “deepening” supplementary innovation.44
Post-filing research and development efforts often result in minor
supplementary innovation when the original patent applicant seeks to improve

42. See Pedraza-Fariña & Whalen, supra note 9, at 63, 65; see also ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 17, at
307; Lemley, supra note 17, at 1008.
43. Others have used similar terminology for follow-on innovation by others. For example, Mark Lemley
has used the term “minor improver” in the context of patent law for others whose improvements are too small
to be patentable as compared to the original patent owner, and in the context of copyright law for others who
make small improvements to original work that receive no special protection under copyright law. See Lemley,
supra note 17, at 1007–08, 1019–20; see also Dennis S. Karjala, Distinguishing Patent and Copyright Subject
Matter, 35 CONN. L. REV. 439, 471 n.128 (2003) (using the terms “minor improver” and “small improver” in
the context of copyright law).
44. This term is borrowed from Nicholson Price, who uses it to describe “innovation that tells us more
about existing technology.” W. Nicholson Price II, The Cost of Novelty, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 769, 769 (2020).
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or optimize the technology. The facts of In re Chu provide an example:45
Babcock & Wilcox, an energy and environmental technology company,46
developed a device for reducing pollutant emissions from coal-fired electric
power plants. The device had a “baghouse” containing components that
chemically reacted with the pollutants to remove them from the waste gases
created during combustion of fossil fuels.47 A little over a year after filing a
patent application on the device, Babcock & Wilcox filed another application on
a device in which the location of the catalyst had been adjusted to improve
performance.48 The new location was not described in the first application,49 but
it would likely be obvious under current law and would thus be minor
supplementary innovation.50
Deepening innovation, on the other hand, often results when the original
patent applicant seeks to better understand how its existing invention works. An
innovator need not understand how or why an invention works at the time of
filing the original application.51 Thus, this understanding often comes from postfiling innovation. For example, the drug company Schering Corporation
originally patented loratadine, the active ingredient in Claritin®.52 Several years
after filing the original application,53 Schering patented a compound (a
“metabolite”) that it had found was created during digestion of loratadine. But
the metabolite claims were later invalidated based on Schering’s own loratadine
patent: the metabolite necessarily formed when patients took loratadine and was
thus “inherently” disclosed by the loratadine patent.54 Because the loratadine

45. In re Chu, 66 F.3d 292 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
46. See Explore B&W, BABCOCK & WILCOX, https://www.babcock.com/en/about (last visited Feb. 4,
2021).
47. See U.S. Patent No. 4,871,522, at [57], col. 2 (filed July 25, 1988).
48. Chu, 66 F.3d at 295–99; U.S. Patent No. 5,567,394, at [63], [73] (filed Oct. 2, 1990). The new
application was a continuation-in-part of the original application. See ’394 Patent, at [63] (describing the
application as a continuation of abandoned U.S. Patent Application No. 404,153, filed September 7, 1989, which
was a continuation-in-part of the ’522 Patent).
49. Chu, 66 F.3d at 295–99.
50. The USPTO found the catalyst location obvious. Id. at 296. On appeal, the Federal Circuit held the
location of the catalyst to be nonobvious, in part because there was no “teaching or suggestion” in the prior art
leading to the new location. Id. at 299. Since the decision, however, the U.S. Supreme Court has rejected rigid
application of the “teaching or suggestion” test for obviousness; under the new standard, many more claimed
inventions are obvious. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415–23 (2007); Harold C. Wegner,
Making Sense of KSR and Other Recent Patent Cases, 106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 39, 41 (2007). A
detailed analysis of post-KSR nonobviousness doctrine and its application to the facts of In re Chu is beyond the
scope of this Article; I describe the facts of the case only as an example of innovation likely to be minor
supplementary innovation.
51. Sean B. Seymore, Patenting the Unexplained, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 707, 719–26 (2019).
52. Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
53. Compare U.S. Patent No. 4,282,233, at [22] (filed June 19, 1980), with U.S. Patent No. 4,659,716, at
[22] (filed Mar. 12, 1986).
54. Schering, 339 F.3d at 1375, 1382. Under the inherency doctrine, a claimed invention is anticipated if
it was “necessarily present” in the prior art, regardless of whether the prior art recognized or appreciated it. Id.
at 1377. Inherency can also play a role in obviousness analysis. See Par Pharm., Inc. v. TWi Pharm., Inc., 773
F.3d 1186, 1194–96 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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patent anticipated the metabolite claims, the metabolite is an example of
deepening innovation.
2. Encompassed and Broadening Supplementary Innovation
Supplementary innovation can also be classified as “encompassed” or
“broadening.” This Article terms supplementary innovation “encompassed”
when, although the supplementary innovation is not described in the original
patent application, the original application can still be used to protect the
supplementary innovation. This is the case when supplementary innovation is
within the scope of patentable claims of the original application. For example,
imagine that Babcock & Wilcox’s first patent for reducing pollutant emissions
claimed “an apparatus for controlling emissions of a fossil fuel fired boiler,
comprising: a flue gas duct; a fabric baghouse; and a catalyst.” With this claim,
the particular location of the catalyst is not specified. Thus, an improved device
with a relocated catalyst would still be “covered” by the claims.
But in other instances, supplementary innovation is not within the scope of
patentable claims of the original patent application. Thus, the original patent
applicant cannot protect the supplementary innovation using a patent resulting
from the original application.55 This Article terms this type of supplementary
innovation “broadening.” Suppose instead that Babcock & Wilcox’s first patent
claimed “an apparatus for controlling emissions of a fossil fuel fired boiler,
comprising: a flue gas duct; a fabric baghouse; and a catalyst located outside the
fabric baghouse.” This claim would not cover an improved device in which the
catalyst had been relocated into the fabric baghouse. Because broadening
supplementary innovation cannot be protected by the original application,56 and
because it is not patentable as compared to the original application, it will be
dedicated to the public domain absent some form of special treatment for the
original applicant.
3. No-Fault and At-Fault Supplementary Innovation
Thus far, this Article has described supplementary innovation as a natural
result of the iterative and complex nature of research and development; most
innovators will carry out at least some post-filing innovation after filing a patent
application. That said, supplementary innovation can also be classified based on
the extent to which the original patent applicant is “at fault” for its post-filing
innovation being rendered unpatentable by its original application.

55. The original patent applicant can protect certain innovation that is slightly outside the bounds of its
original patent’s claims. Under the doctrine of equivalents, “a product or process that does not literally infringe
upon the express terms of a patent claim may nonetheless be found to infringe if there is ‘equivalence’ between
the elements of the accused product or process and the claimed elements of the patented invention.” WarnerJenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997).
56. This example assumes that Babcock & Wilcox could not obtain another, broader claim covering a
catalyst relocated into the fabric baghouse based on the first patent application.
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One way the original applicant can be at fault for supplementary innovation
is by filing the original patent application too early—that is, before the applicant
is far enough along in the innovation process to obtain valid patent claims. For
example, to be patentable, an invention must have “utility.”57 The threshold for
satisfying the utility requirement is very low for many areas of technology, but
the requirement can be meaningful for some innovation, particularly in the life
sciences.58 If the original application discloses an invention but fails to establish
its utility—for example, the application describes a new drug compound but
does not include sufficient preclinical evidence of its therapeutic effect—the
invention will not be validly patentable in the original application.59 If the
original patent applicant then carries out new research that establishes utility and
tries to file a new application claiming the same invention, the original
application will anticipate the new claims.60 In this scenario, the original patent
applicant is at fault for rendering the deepening supplementary innovation
unpatentable.
A similar situation arises when an original application fails to meet the
“enablement” requirement—the requirement that a patent application must
enable a person skilled in the art to make and use the invention.61 If the original
application discloses the broad strokes of an invention but does not provide
enough information to adequately enable it, the invention will not be validly
patentable in that original application. But if the original applicant later figures
out the enabling details and files a new patent application, the new application’s
claims are likely to be rejected as anticipated by the original application’s
disclosure.62
In both of these examples of at-fault supplementary innovation, the
supplementary innovation should not have been post-filing innovation at all; the
original patent applicant should have waited to file its first application. In
57. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1369–72 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The utility requirement is based in 35 U.S.C.
§ 101’s language that inventors can obtain patents for “useful” inventions. See id. at 1370; 35 U.S.C. § 101
(2018). For more extensive discussion of the utility requirement, see, for example, Michael Risch, Reinventing
Usefulness, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1195 (2010), and Sean B. Seymore, Making Patents Useful, 98 MINN. L. REV.
1046 (2014).
58. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1644–46
(2003).
59. See Roin, supra note 18, at 522–23.
60. See In re Hafner, 410 F.2d 1403, 1405 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (“[A] disclosure lacking [utility] is . . . entirely
adequate to anticipate a claim . . . and, at the same time, entirely inadequate to support the allowance of such a
claim.”); Roin, supra note 18, at 522.
61. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 735 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
62. A prior art application’s nonenabling disclosure should not, in theory, have this effect because
anticipating prior art must not only disclose the claimed invention but also enable it. Schering Corp. v. Geneva
Pharm., 339 F.3d 1373, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2003). However, during examination by the USPTO, the burden is
on the applicant to rebut a presumption of enablement. Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d
1313, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2003). This presumption is hard to overcome, see Sean B. Seymore, Reinvention, 92
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1031, 1059–60 (2017), and especially so for the original patent applicant. In practice, an
applicant will usually avoid arguing that its own application is nonenabling. Cf. Nathan T. Lewis, Scott W.
Hackwelder & Peter D. Siddoway, Considerations for Handling Closely Related Subject Matter in Patent
Portfolios in Light of Therasense and the America Invents Act of 2011, 53 IDEA 63, 91 (2013) (“[A] patent
prosecutor should take all reasonable measures to avoid arguing against a client’s own prior art.”).
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contrast, in “no-fault” supplementary innovation, there is no clear error by the
original patent applicant in its first application; the first application describes its
claimed invention sufficiently to be validly patentable. The exact line between
at-fault and no-fault supplementary innovation is blurry. But it is nonetheless
worth recognizing that the original patent applicant may be more or less culpable
for post-filing innovation’s unpatentability.
For each type of supplementary innovation, whether minor or deepening,
encompassed or broadening, no-fault or at-fault, a new patent application
specifically claiming the supplementary innovation should as a general rule be
unpatentable in view of the original application. But concerns about the resulting
limitations on innovators have driven changes to the patent system. These
changes grant preferential treatment to original patent applicants such that they
can sometimes—but not always—patent this otherwise unpatentable innovation.
I turn to the historical development of these changes next.

II. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT
The law creating preferential treatment for original patent applicants has
developed piecemeal over time. As Congress has sought to adapt the patent
system to better accommodate collaborative research and development, the law
has gradually shifted toward favoring original patent applicants over other
follow-on innovators, while also expanding who qualifies as an original patent
applicant.
A. PATENT ACT OF 1952
The Patent Act of 195263 provided the basic statutory structure for novelty
and nonobviousness until the passage of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act
(AIA) in 2011.64 Section 102 of the 1952 Act set forth categories of “prior art”
that rendered an invention unpatentable.65 Most importantly for the discussion
here, the invention was rendered unpatentable if it was “patented . . . [(a)] before
the invention thereof . . . [or (b)] more than one year prior to the date of the
application for patent,” “(e) . . . described in a patent granted on an application
for patent by another filed . . . before the invention thereof,” or “(g) . . . before
[the] invention thereof . . . made . . . by another who had not abandoned,
suppressed, or concealed it;” or if the person applying for the patent “(f) . . . did
not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented.”66 Section 103 of the
Act then specified that even if “the invention is not identically disclosed or
63. Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 593, 66 Stat. 792 (1952).
64. Cf. Merges, supra note 4 (describing priority and novelty under the AIA as compared to under the
Patent Act of 1952).
65. See In re Harry, 333 F.2d 920, 924 n.2 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (discussing the term “prior art”). While statute
forms the basis of what is prior art, many of the nuances are created by courts and are not discernable from the
statute. See Mark A. Lemley, Does “Public Use” Mean the Same Thing It Did Last Year?, 93 TEX. L. REV.
1119, 1134 (2015); Merges, supra note 4, at 1033–34.
66. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1958) (emphasis added).
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described as set forth in section 102 of this title,” it was not patentable if it was
obvious in light of the prior art.67
In this early form, a narrowly defined group of original patent applicants
received some preferential treatment allowing them to patent supplementary
innovation. This preferential treatment arose from the language “by another” in
§ 102(e).68 As a result of this language, original patent applicants, but not others,
could patent supplementary innovation that occurred before the original
application was issued as a granted patent, as long as the original applicant filed
the new application within a year of the original application’s issuance and there
was no other prior art rendering the new application’s claims unpatentable.69
Because of this favored treatment for original patent applicants, where the
line was drawn between them and others by the language “by another” was
significant. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA), the Federal
Circuit’s predecessor court,70 grappled with where to draw this line in a pair of
cases in the 1960s. The cases stemmed from a series of applications on film
technology owned by Polaroid Corporation, “all flow[ing] from the same
research out of the same laboratory.”71 Three different inventors’ work was
reflected in the applications; on some applications they were solo inventors, and
on some applications two of the three were joint inventors.72 At issue in both
cases was whether the earlier-filed solo-inventor patents were “by another” with
respect to the later-filed joint-inventor applications. If they were, the soloinventor patents would be prior art against the joint-inventor applications.73
67. Id. § 103.
68. Section 102(g) was also limited to “by another,” but that subsection was originally only invoked in
particular disputes between rival applicants both claiming the same invention, called “interferences.” The text
accompanying notes 81–92 addresses § 102(g)’s role in preferential treatment.
69. This was because under § 102(e), an earlier-filed and ultimately granted application “by another” was
prior art to a later-filed application if the earlier-filed application was filed before the invention of the later-filed
application’s invention. In contrast, the original applicant’s own earlier-filed application (that is, not “by
another”) did not quality as prior art under § 102(e). Therefore, the original applicant’s own earlier-filed
application was prior art to its later-filed application only if the earlier-filed application issued as a granted patent
before the later-filed application’s invention (§ 102(a) prior art); or if the earlier-filed application was issued as
a granted patent more than a year before the later-filed application was filed (§ 102(b) prior art). See 35 U.S.C.
§ 102 (1958).
Because § 102 contained various geographic restrictions with respect to the origin of prior art, see 35
U.S.C. § 102 (1958), preferential treatment was more complex when applications were filed and/or innovation
originated outside the United States. These complexities, in their original form and as they were amended over
time, go beyond the scope of this Article. This Article assumes throughout that original and later patent
applications are filed in the United States, and that innovation takes place in the United States.
70. Marion T. Bennett, The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit—Origins, in THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT: A HISTORY 1982–1990, at 1, 7 (1991). The
Federal Circuit now has exclusive appellate jurisdiction of appeals from “a final decision of a district court . . . in
any civil action arising under, or in any civil action in which a party has asserted a compulsory counterclaim
arising under, any Act of Congress relating to patents or plant variety protection” and from “a decision of the
Patent Trial and Appeal Board of the United States Patent and Trademark Office with respect to a patent
application.” 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2018).
71. In re Land, 368 F.2d 866, 878 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
72. See id. at 868; In re Blout, 333 F.2d 928, 929–30 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
73. See Land, 368 F.2d at 875–81; Blout, 333 F.2d at 931.
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In In re Blout in 1964, the CCPA held that one of the earlier-filed soloinventor patents was “not ‘another’ to” a later-filed joint-inventor application.74
Yet, two years later, in In re Land, the court held the opposite: that two of the
earlier-filed solo-inventor patents were both “by another” with respect to a laterfiled joint-inventor application.75 The decision in Land meant that the innovator
team from an original patent application could patent its own supplementary
innovation that occurred before the original patent application issued (subject to
any other prior art).76 But if the supplementary innovation involved any new
individual, or if it did not involve even a single original team member, the
supplementary innovation was unpatentable.77
This required companies to be very careful about the timing and content of
their patent applications. A contemporary commentator described:
With the increasing complexity of modern research and development, it
frequently happens that a single project spawns several inventions. Such
projects usually require a group effort, and the resulting inventions are not all
contributed by the same “inventive entity.” . . . If the attorney proceeds in
what would seem to be a normal manner, and files several applications over a
period of time, then the provision of 35 USC 102 (e) is likely to be used to

74. See Blout, 333 F.2d at 931.
75. See Land, 368 F.2d at 881. The court addressed the apparent inconsistency with Blout in a footnote,
stating that “[o]n reconsidering our opinion in [Blout], wherein it was remarked that ‘Rogers is not ‘another’ to
Blout and Rogers,’ we now think that remark to have been unfortunate.” Id. at 879 n.10. The court explained
that the “true basis” of its decision in Blout was that the solo-inventor Rogers patent included description of joint
work by Blout and Rogers. Id. The description of the joint work, contained within Rogers’ solo patent, was not
“by another” with respect to the Blout and Rogers joint-inventor patent. See id.
A different but related fact pattern was recently addressed in Duncan Parking Technologies, Inc. v. IPS
Group, Inc., in which the Federal Circuit held that an earlier-filed patent naming King and Schwarz as inventors
anticipated a later-filed patent naming King and three others as inventors. See Duncan Parking Tech., Inc. v. IPS
Group, Inc., 914 F.3d 1347, 1352–53, 1357–58 (Fed. Cir. 2019). There the Federal Circuit, like the CCPA’s
reconsideration of Blout in Land, considered the origin of the specific anticipating disclosure in the earlier-filed
patent. See id. at 1357–59. The court stated, citing Land, that “[i]f Schwarz is a joint inventor of the anticipating
disclosure, then it is ‘by another’ for the purposes of § 102(e).” Id. at 1357 (citing Land, 368 F.2d at 879).
76. Cf. Land, 368 F.2d at 877 (“There appears to be no dispute as to the law that A is not ‘another’ as to
A, B is not ‘another’ as to B, or even that A & B are not ‘another’ as to A & B.”).
77. As the Federal Circuit made clear in Duncan Parking, the analysis under pre-AIA law is not simply a
comparison of listed inventors, but rather a comparison of the inventors of the later-filed application with the
innovators making sufficient contributions to the relevant content in the original application. See Duncan
Parking, 914 F.3d at 1358 (“[T]o decide whether a reference patent is ‘by another’ for the purposes of 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(e), the Board must (1) determine what portions of the reference patent were relied on as prior art . . . , (2)
evaluate the degree to which those portions were conceived ‘by another,’ and (3) decide whether that other
person’s contribution is significant enough, when measured against the full anticipating disclosure, to render
him a joint inventor of the applied portions of the reference patent.”). A discrepancy between inventorship and
contribution to the disclosure of a patent application can occur because inventorship is based the application’s
claims. Cf. 35 U.S.C. § 116(a) (2018) (“Inventors may apply for a patent jointly even though . . . each did not
make a contribution to . . . every claim.”); 37 C.F.R. § 1.48 (2018) (describing the procedures for correcting or
changing inventorship, for example due to “cancelation of claims in the application”); Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S.
Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“A contribution to one claim is enough.”). Thus, an
individual can contribute to the original patent application’s disclosure without being an inventor, and
conversely, an inventor may not have contributed to all of the disclosure in the application.
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reject the later filed applications on the disclosure of a patent issued on one or
more of the earlier filed applications.78

The constraints on patenting team-based research and development
increased considerably in 1973, when the CCPA held in In re Bass that the
invention of a company’s earlier-filed patent “by another” was available as prior
art against the company’s later-filed application for demonstrating obviousness
if the patent’s invention was invented before the application’s invention—even
if the patent was filed after the application’s invention.79 Bass thus suggested
that delaying the first application’s filing would no longer prevent that
application from potentially rendering later innovation unpatentable.80
In reaching this conclusion, the court in Bass relied on § 102(g), which
precluded a patent on an invention that had been “made . . . by another who had
not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it” before the applicant’s invention.81
Previously, the CCPA had only considered § 102(g) in the context of particular
disputes between rival applicants both claiming the same invention.82 Yet the
court in Bass departed from this limitation on § 102(g) and allowed it to be
considered in a context unrelated to such a dispute.83
These decisions set up a challenging situation for companies engaged in
team-based research and development. Under the “all-claims” rule applied by
some courts, companies were required to file different teams’ inventions in
78. Bernard E. Franz, Prosecution Problems with a Plurality of Inventions from a Single Project, 51 J.
PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 559, 559 (1969) (footnote omitted); see also Donald G. Daus, New and Unobvious Changes to
U.S. Patent Law, 3 INTELL. PROP. J. 71, 78 (1987) (stating, with respect to “the concept of ‘another’,” that
“[p]roblems arise most frequently with rejection under section 102(e),” and that to “avoid the pitfalls the word
‘another’ caused, solicitors would file applications for closely related inventions with different entities on the
same day”).
79. See In re Bass, 474 F.2d 1276, 1277, 1281, 1286–87 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
80. The Bass court was split such that the tiebreaking opinion “established the court’s narrow precedent
and essentially limited Bass’ approval of a § 102(g) / § 103 rejection to the facts of that case,” Andrew C.
Michaels, Pot Calls the Kettle Dictum: Expanded Secret Prior Art in Obviousness, 26 FED. CIR. B.J. 93, 95
(2016), circumstances “which include the disclosure of such invention in an issued patent.” Bass, 474 F.2d at
1307 (Lane, J., concurring).
81. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1958).
82. See Bass, 474 F.2d at 1283; Peter J. Shurn III, Is the Invention of Another Available as Prior Art? In
Re Bass to In re Clemens and Beyond, 63 J. PAT. OFF. SOC ’Y 516, 518–19 (1981). This particular type of dispute
was called an “interference.” See 35 U.S.C. § 135 (1958); Bass, 474 F.2d at 1283. The limitation to interferences
was consistent with legislative history. See Bass, 474 F.2d at 1298–99 (Baldwin, J., concurring); Shurn, supra,
at 518–19.
83. See Bass, 474 F.2d at 1283–87. Three years earlier, the Seventh Circuit had similarly concluded that
an earlier-invented but later-filed patent could be prior art under § 102(g), and could be used to establish
obviousness, outside the context of an interference. See Sutter Products Co. v. Pettibone Mulliken Corp., 428
F.2d 639, 644–46 (7th Cir. 1970); see also Bass, 474 F.2d at 1286.
The CCPA later in In re Clemens appeared to limit Bass to situations in which one of the application’s
inventors or the public had knowledge of the earlier invention when making the application’s later invention.
See In re Clemens, 622 F.2d 1029, 1039–40 (C.C.P.A. 1980). The Federal Circuit subsequently dismissed
Clemens’ discussion of a knowledge requirement as dictum, see Tyco Healthcare Grp. v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery,
774 F.3d 968, 976 (Fed. Cir. 2014); E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petro. Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1437
(Fed. Cir. 1988), although it is not clear that the characterization as dictum was correct. See Michaels, supra
note 80.
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separate patent applications.84 Yet, filing a patent application on an invention by
one team could undermine the patentability of an invention by another team.
Indeed, one of the concurring opinions in Bass critiqued its result, arguing that
it was at odds with collaborative, iterative innovation, and that it could push
companies to rely on trade secrets instead of patents.85 A contemporary article
in the Journal of the Patent Office Society similarly described that “it is not
surprising that Bass has evoked a loud cry from industry, especially the larger
corporations whose typical research and development situation involves a group
of technical people working on the same general program.”86
B. PATENT LAW AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1984
In 1984, Congress enacted amendments to the Patent Act in response to the
problems that had developed over the preceding decades.87 The Senate
Committee on the Judiciary’s report described that the bill changed “a complex
body of case law which discourages communication among members of research
teams working in corporations, universities or other organizations.”88
First, the amendments allowed for joint inventorship of a patent application
even when not every joint inventor had contributed to every claim.89 This
allowed a single application to contain claims invented by different groups of
inventors.90
Second, in response to Bass, 35 U.S.C. § 103 was amended to add the
following language:
84. Gregory N. Mandel, Left-Brain versus Right-Brain: Competing Conceptions of Creativity in
Intellectual Property Law, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. R EV. 283, 293 (2010); see, e.g., In re Sarett, 327 F.2d 1005, 1010
n.7 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
85. See Bass, 474 F.2d at 1304 (Baldwin, J., concurring) (“Most [inventions] are the result of carefully
planned scientific research, often with numerous persons working on various aspects of a given problem.
Invention is often reached via a large number of small steps forward. Given the possibility that the special
knowledge of the inventor’s coworkers developed during the pursuance of the invention would be usable against
any patent based on the invention which is the end result of the research effort, investors and corporate
management would, or should, be most wary of using the patent system to protect any commercially valuable
invention, rather than following the trade secret route.”).
86. Harris A. Pitlick, A Proposed Compromise to the “Prior Art” Controversy Surrounding In Re Hellsund
and In Re Bass, 56 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 699, 708–09 (1974). The outcome of Bass was also particularly
objectionable to American companies because § 102(g) prior art was limited to earlier inventions “made in this
country.” See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1958). Bass thus advantaged foreign companies over domestic ones; the same
commentator suggested that “[i]t is thus foreseeable that if Bass is rigorously followed, those American
companies in industries where patents are important which are wealthy enough to move all or part of their
research and development capabilities outside the United States may well do so.” Pitlick, supra, at 709.
87. See Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-622, 98 Stat. 3383 (1984).
88. S. REP. NO. 98-663, at 7 (1984); accord Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, H.R. 6286, 98th Cong.,
130 CONG. REC. 28071 (1984) (enacted).
89. See Patent Law Amendments Act § 104, 98 Stat. at 3384–85 (amending 35 U.S.C. § 116); Daus, supra
note 78, at 73–74; Mandel, supra note 84, at 293–94.
90. The Senate Report described that the amendment “recognizes the realities of modern team research. A
research project may include many inventions. Some inventions may have contributions made by individuals
who are not involved in other, related inventions.” S. REP. NO. 98-663, at 8; accord H.R. 6286, 98th Cong., 130
CONG. REC. 28071.
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Subject matter developed by another person, which qualifies as prior art
only under subsection (f) or (g) of section 102 of this title, shall not preclude
patentability under this section where the subject matter and the claimed
invention were, at the time the invention was made, owned by the same person
or subject to an obligation of assignment to the same person.91

Thus, overriding Bass, the amendment excluded commonly owned § 102(g)
prior art from analysis under § 103.92 The result was that a company could avoid
having its earlier invention render its later invention unpatentable by waiting to
file a patent application on the earlier invention until after the later invention
took place.93 The Senate Report described that the amendment would
“encourage communication among members of research teams, and lead to more
public dissemination through patents.”94
In creating this safe harbor, however, Congress made clear that it intended
a quid pro quo of patent scope for term through the expansion of double
patenting doctrine.95 Double patenting was an existing doctrine that prevented
(and still prevents) a patentee from “obtaining a time-wise extension of patent
for the same invention or an obvious modification thereof.”96 The doctrine
predated the Patent Act of 1952,97 but its core elements were filled in largely
during the 1960s and early 1970s.98 In this period, the CCPA first approved of
allowing a patent applicant to overcome obviousness-type double patenting—
double patenting in which the claims of one patent are obvious in view of the
claims of the other—by filing a “terminal disclaimer.”99 In a terminal disclaimer,
the patentee agrees that one patent will expire no later than the other.100
91. See Patent Law Amendments Act § 103, 98 Stat. at 3384; S. REP. NO. 98-663, at 7 (referring to Bass
and Clemens). The USPTO’s guidelines interpreted “person” to include “organization,” and “owned by the same
person” to require that “the same person, persons, or organization own 100% of the subject matter (prior art) and
100% of the claimed invention.” PTO’s Initial Guidelines as to Implementation of Patent Law Amendments,
reprinted in 29 BNA’S PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 214, 214 (1984).
92. See infra Part II.C.1 addressing the inclusion of § 102(f) in the amendment.
93. If the company filed the patent application on the earlier invention before the later invention took place,
the earlier-filed application would be prior art under § 102(e) upon issuance unless it was not “by another.” See
35 U.S.C. § 102(e) (1988).
94. S. REP. NO. 98-663, at 7; accord H.R. 6286, 98th Cong., 130 CONG. REC. 28071.
95. Donald G. Daus, Double Patenting: More Is Not Always Better, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y
740, 740 (1991) (describing double patenting rejections as the “quid pro quo” for the new safe harbor).
96. In re Lonardo, 119 F.3d 960, 965 (Fed. Cir. 1997). More specifically, it bars a patentee from receiving
two patents claiming identical subject matter (“statutory” double patenting) or two patents where the claims of
one are obvious in view of the claims of the other (“non-statutory” or “obviousness-type” double patenting).
Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S. 186, 196–97 (1894); Sun Pharm. Indus., Ltd. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 611 F.3d
1381, 1384–85 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
97. See Eagle Mfg., 151 U.S. at 196–97; U.S. PATENT OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE §§ 801–02 (1st ed. 1949).
98. See Daus, supra note 95, at 741.
99. See Sun Pharm., 611 F.3d at 1384–85; In re Robeson, 331 F.2d 610, 613–15 (C.C.P.A. 1964); Daus,
supra note 95, at 744.
100. Cf. In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 894 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (describing that a terminal disclaimer “guarantee[s]
that the second patent . . . expire[s] at the same time as the first patent”). Section 253 of the Patent Act allows a
patentee or patent applicant to “disclaim or dedicate to the public the entire term, or any terminal part of the
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With the 1984 amendments, Congress conveyed its expectation that the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) would expand double patenting
doctrine to apply to claims in commonly owned applications to prevent “an
organization from obtaining two or more patents with different expiration dates
covering nearly identical subject matter.”101 Congress further conveyed its
expectation that “double patenting rejections [resulting from the new safe
harbor] can be overcome in certain circumstances by disclaiming the terminal
portion of the term of the later patent, thereby eliminating the problem of
extending patent life.”102 The USPTO subsequently issued guidance for
examiners, and then promulgated rules, such that a double patenting rejection
could be made based on a commonly owned patent with different or partially
overlapping inventorship, and that when the rejection was an obviousness-type
double patenting rejection, it could be overcome by filing a terminal
disclaimer.103
Thus, the 1984 amendments and accompanying expansion of double
patenting set out two important policy positions with respect to preferential
treatment. The first was that, to accommodate collaborative innovation, some
preferential treatment should be based on ownership, rather than being restricted
to specific groups of inventors. The amendments made some preferential
treatment available for different groups of inventors within a single organization,
as well as for collaborations between different organizations, provided that the
organizations put the appropriate assignment agreements in place.104 The second
was that preferential treatment should be limited to additional patent scope but
not term: that is, the amendments allowed an original patent applicant to receive
multiple patents on similar inventions, as long as this did not result in longer
patent protection.
C. AIPA OF 1999 AND CREATE ACT OF 2004
Preferential treatment for original patent applicants was further changed by
amendments to the Patent Act in 1999 and 2004. Some of the changes were the
result of amendments specifically intended to expand eligibility; others were the
result of amendments to other provisions that had indirect effects.

term, of the patent granted or to be granted.” 35 U.S.C. § 253 (1958); 35 U.S.C. § 253 (2018). See supra Part
IV.B.1 for further discussion of terminal disclaimers to overcome obviousness-type double patenting.
101. S. Rep. No. 98-663, at 8 (1984); accord Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, H.R. 6286, 98th Cong.,
130 CONG. REC. 28071 (1984) (enacted).
102. S. Rep. No. 98-663, at 8; accord H.R. 6286, 98th Cong., 130 CONG. REC. 28071.
103. Longi, 759 F.2d at 895; PTO’s Initial Guidelines, supra note 91, at 214; 37 C.F.R. § 1.78(d) (1985);
Final Rules for Miscellaneous Patent Provisions, 50 Fed. Reg. 9368, 9381 (Mar. 7, 1985) (to be codified at 37
C.F.R. pt. 1).
104. H.R. REP. NO. 108-425, at 3–4 (2004).
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1. Expanding the Safe Harbor under § 103
The 1999 and 2004 amendments to the Patent Act further broadened the
scope of applicants falling into the favored group. First, the American Inventors
Protection Act of 1999 (AIPA) expanded the 1984 safe harbor (which in 1995
had been designated as § 103(c)105) to include § 102(e) prior art.106 That is, the
amended language of the § 103(c) safe harbor read:
Subject matter developed by another person, which qualifies as prior art only
under one or more of subsections (e), (f), and (g) of section 102 of this title,
shall not preclude patentability under this section where the subject matter and
the claimed invention were, at the time the invention was made, owned by the
same person or subject to an obligation of assignment to the same person.107

After the amendment, the original patent application’s owner could patent
its own minor supplementary innovation that occurred while the original patent
application was still secret, regardless of inventorship (subject to any other prior
art).108 As a result, the difficulties associated with In re Land’s interpretation of
“by another” were eliminated for minor supplementary innovation (but not
deepening supplementary innovation) when research and development took
place within a single organization, or across multiple organizations with
appropriate assignment agreements.109 This change was significant; at the time,
some practitioners counseled clients to refile certain pending applications to take
advantage of the broadened eligibility for preferential treatment.110
Eligibility for preferential treatment was further expanded in 2004. The
expansion was in response to the Federal Circuit’s decision in OddzOn Products,
Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc.,111 in which the court held that confidential disclosures to
105. See Pub. L. No. 104-41, § 1, 109 Stat. 351, 351 (1995).
106. See American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 4807(a), 113 Stat. 1501A-552,
1501A-591 (1999).
107. Id.
108. That is, a commonly owned, earlier-filed application could only be a basis for nonobviousness if it
became publicly available before the invention of the later-filed application’s claimed invention, or more than a
year before the later application’s filing. Once the earlier-filed application was publicly available, it became
prior art under § 102(a) or § 102(b) as “patented or described in a printed publication.” See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)–
(b) (2000).
109. Under U.S. law, inventors generally initially own the patent rights in their inventions, Bd. of Trs. of the
Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. 776, 785–86 (2011), but inventors who
generate inventions in the course of their employment will typically assign those inventions to their employer,
as required under their employment agreement. Cf. id.
110. See, e.g., Gregory J. Maier & Philippe Signore, Pardon Our Dust: US Patent Law under Renovation,
MANAGING INTELL. PROP., May 2001, at 23, 26; Michael R. McGurk, Rebecca M. McNeill & Charles E. Van
Horn, Report: The American Investors Protection Act of 1999, FINNEGAN (Dec. 1999) (on file with author). By
filing a continuing application based on the pending application, a patent applicant could take advantage of the
broadened eligibility without losing the pending application’s priority date. See American Inventors Protection
Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 4807(b), 113 Stat. 1501A-552, 1501A-591 (1999) (“The amendment made
by this section shall apply to any application for patent filed on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.”);
infra note 180 and accompanying text.
111. OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396 (Fed. Cir. 1997); H.R. REP. NO. 108-425, at 2
(2004).
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the inventor were available as prior art to render an invention obvious.112 The
court concluded that the confidential disclosures were prior art under § 102(f),
which prevented granting a patent to a person who “did not himself invent the
subject matter sought to be patented,” and that § 102(f) prior art was available
for establishing obviousness under § 103.113
The Federal Circuit felt the outcome was “inescapable” given the statutory
language, but it invited Congress to correct it.114 The outcome was viewed as “a
significant potential threat to inventors who engage in collaborative research and
development projects,” and its “potential ‘chilling effect’ for communication
and open collaboration . . . troubled many academics and researchers.”115 It was
particularly problematic for public-private research partnerships.116
Collaborative research and development efforts across multiple organizations
could rely on the safe harbor as long as common ownership was established
ahead of time.117 Public-sector organizations, however, were typically restricted
in their ability to assign ownership; thus, public-private partnerships were
disadvantaged as compared to private-private partnerships.118
In 2004, Congress responded to OddzOn with the Cooperative Research
and Technology Enhancement (CREATE) Act.119 The CREATE Act added
language to § 103 specifying that work under joint research agreements would
be treated as commonly owned.120 Structuring the amendment in this way meant
that although OddzOn had related to § 102(f) prior art, eligibility for the safe
harbor under § 103 was broadened for all three types of prior art it specified—
112. See OddzOn, 122 F.3d at 1401–04. Two designs had been confidentially disclosed to the inventor of a
design patent on a football-like ball. Id. at 1400.
113. See id. at 1402–04.
114. See id. at 1403. In Bass, the CCPA had stated in dicta that “[o]f course . . . [§ 102](f) ha[s] no relation
to § 103 and no relevancy to what is ‘prior art’ under § 103.” In re Bass, 474 F.2d 1276, 1290 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
In OddzOn, however, the Federal Circuit reasoned that the Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984 had amended
§ 103 to exclude § 102(f) prior art if it was commonly owned. Thus, § 103’s exclusion of § 102(f) prior art
“under limited circumstances clearly implies that it is prior art otherwise.” OddzOn, 122 F.3d at 1403. The
USPTO had taken a similar position in its initial guidelines for implementation of the 1984 amendments and in
its regulations. PTO’s Initial Guidelines, supra note 91, at 214; 37 C.F.R. § 1.106(d) (1985).
115. H.R. REP. No. 108-425, at 5.
116. Id.
117. See id. at 3–4.
118. See id. at 5; cf. Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part I of II,
21 FED. CIR. B.J. 435, 489 (2012) (describing that the CREATE Act was “enacted principally for the benefit of
universities, many of whom face legal and institutional barriers to assigning their inventions to other entities”).
119. Cooperative Research and Technology Enhancement (CREATE) Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-453,
118 Stat. 3596; see H.R. REP. NO. 108-425, at 2 (describing the act as responding to OddzOn).
120. See CREATE Act § 2. A literal reading of the amendment seemed to say that any subject matter
developed by another person (even if not a party to the joint research agreement) qualified for the safe harbor if
the claimed invention was made under the agreement. See id. (“(2) . . . subject matter developed by another
person and a claimed invention shall be deemed to have been owned by the same person or subject to an
obligation of assignment to the same person if—(A) the claimed invention was made by or on behalf of parties
to a joint research agreement that was in effect on or before the date the claimed invention was made; [and]
(B) . . . was made as a result of activities undertaken within the scope of the joint research agreement . . . .”);
Matal, supra note 118, at 487–88. However, the corrective language was read into the statute until it was added
by the AIA. Matal, supra note 118, at 488.
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that is, § 102(e), (f), and (g) prior art. The amendment thus expanded who could
patent minor supplementary innovation. After the amendment, inventors
working on commonly assigned projects or under joint research agreements
could patent minor supplementary innovation that occurred while original
applications were still secret (subject to any other prior art).
As in 1984, Congress called upon double patenting to prevent any
extension of patent term. The House Report stated that “[b]y enacting this
legislation, Congress intends to extend this exemption . . . again subject to the
same double patenting principles.”121 The Report specified that the doctrine of
obviousness-type double patenting should apply to patents issued as a result of
the CREATE Act, and that a terminal disclaimer could overcome such double
patenting when appropriate.122 Again, the USPTO issued guidance and
promulgated rules expanding the application of double patenting and terminal
disclaimers accordingly.123
2. Pre-Grant Publication
A second major change occurred as part of the AIPA in 1999. Though this
change was not specifically intended to affect an original patent applicant’s
ability to patent supplementary innovation, it ended up doing so indirectly.
Before the AIPA, U.S. patent applications were secret until issuance as a
granted patent.124 The AIPA amended 35 U.S.C. § 122 such that patent
applications began to be published eighteen months from their priority date,
subject to certain exceptions.125 Section 102(e) was correspondingly amended to
include as prior art not only “a patent granted on an application for patent by
another” filed before invention, but also “an application for patent, published
under section 122(b), by another” filed before invention.126
121. H.R. REP. NO. 108-425, at 6.
122. See id.
123. See OFF. OF PAT. LEGAL ADMIN., EXAMINER CHECKLIST FOR PRIOR ART EXCLUSIONS UNDER 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(C) AS AMENDED BY THE COOPERATIVE RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY ENHANCEMENT (CREATE) ACT 2
(2005), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/exrchecklist.pdf; Changes to Implement the
Cooperative Research and Technology Enhancement Act of 2004, 70 Fed. Reg. 1818, 1820–21, 1823–24 (Jan.
11, 2005) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1, 3) (interim rule); Changes to Implement the Cooperative Research
and Technology Enhancement Act of 2004, 70 Fed. Reg. 54,259, 54,261–62 (Sept. 14, 2005) (to be codified at
37 C.F.R. pt. 1, 3) (final rule). The interim rule added 37 C.F.R. § 1.109 setting forth guidelines for double
patenting rejections, but the final rule removed § 1.109, and the double patenting guidelines were instead added
to the Manual of Patenting Examining Procedure. See Changes to Implement the Cooperative Research and
Technology Enhancement Act, 70 Fed. Reg. at 54,261. Section 1.321 setting forth terminal disclaimer
requirements remained in the final rule. See id. at 54,262.
124. John R. Thomas, The American Inventors Protection Act of 1999: Overview and Analysis, in 6 INT’L
INTELL. PROP. L. & POL’Y 13-1, 13-5 (Hugh C. Hansen ed., 2001); H.R. Rep. 106-287, at 32 (1999).
125. See American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 4502, 113 Stat. 1501A-552,
1501A-561 (1999). The change took effect for applications filed on or after November 29, 2000. See id. § 4508;
Press Release, USPTO, USPTO Will Begin Publishing Patent Applications (Nov. 27, 2000),
https://web.archive.org/web/20150905092115/https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/uspto-will-beginpublishing-patent-applications.
126. See American Inventors Protection Act of 1999 § 4505 (emphasis added).
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Amendments to the Patent Act had, to this point, been toward expanded
preferential treatment for original patent applicants, by excluding certain of their
existing applications from obviousness analysis, and by broadening who was
eligible. But application publication had the indirect—and seemingly
overlooked127—effect of reduced preferential treatment. When patent
applications were secret until issuance, an earlier-filed application only became
prior art if it issued as a patent. If it was abandoned and never became a granted
patent, it did not become prior art at all.128 Moreover, the original patent
applicant could patent supplementary innovation invented before the original
application issued (subject to any other prior art).129 After the institution of pregrant publication, this period for inventing supplementary innovation that could
be patented, which this Article terms the “supplementation grace period,” ended
with publication.130 Many supplementation grace periods were thus shorter than
they would have been pre-AIPA.131 The practical impact, however, was
attenuated by the pre-existing practice of patent application publication outside

127. My research has not revealed any discussion of this issue. Contemporary commentary discussed that
publication would lead to earlier public disclosure of innovation, and that this was valuable to competitors, but
not specifically that it was valuable to competitors because it put them on more equal ground with respect to
supplementary innovation. See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Hayden Gregory, Robert Rines, Herbert Wamsley &
Douglas Wyatt, Early Patent Publication: A Boon or Bane? A Discussion on the Legal and Economic Effects of
Publishing Patent Applications after Eighteen Months of Filing, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 601, 620 (1998).
One explanation for the lack of contemporary discussion is that the practical effect of the amendment was limited
for innovators who filed patent applications internationally. See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
128. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.108 (1988); MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 901.02 (5th ed., rev. 9,
1988). Exceptions applied when an abandoned application was defensively published or was incorporated by
reference into an issued patent; in those cases, the abandoned application was available to the public and could
be prior art. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.108; MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra.
129. Since eligibility for preferential treatment differed between deepening and minor supplementary
innovation, unless the innovation was not “by another,” only minor supplementary innovation, not deepening
supplementary innovation, could be patented in this window (subject to any other prior art). See 35 U.S.C.
§§ 102–103 (1994).
130. Again, unless the innovation was not “by another,” only minor supplementary innovation, but not
deepening supplementary innovation, could be patented in this window (subject to any other prior art). See 35
U.S.C. §§ 102–103 (2000).
131. Whereas publication was generally eighteen months from the priority date, 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)
(2000), the average time from filing to issuance or abandonment in fiscal year 2000 was twenty-five months.
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2000, at 104
(2000), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/about/stratplan/ar/USPTOFY2000PAR.pdf. The average time
from priority date to issuance was likely significantly longer: the Uruguay Round Agreements Act had created
provisional applications in 1995; as such, up to one year could elapse between a priority date based on a
provisional application and the filing date for the first nonprovisional application in a patent family. Uruguay
Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. 103-465, §§ 532, 534, 108 Stat. 4809, 4985–86, 4990 (1994). USPTO data also
understated the relevant application pendencies in certain ways. See Dennis Crouch, Average Patent Application
Pendency, PATENTLY-O (Dec. 12, 2011), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2011/12/average-patent-applicationpendency.html (discussing the treatment of requests for continued examination and the inclusion of continuing
applications in USPTO pendency data). Average application pendency increased through the 2000s but has been
decreasing since. See Dennis Crouch, Pendency of US Patent Applications, PATENTLY-O (Nov. 6, 2016),
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/11/pendency-patent-applications.html.
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the United States132 and the ability of some patent applicants to opt out of
publication.133
D. AMERICA INVENTS ACT OF 2011
The passage of the AIA in 2011 significantly altered the structure of
§§ 102–103 of the Patent Act.134 At a high level, it maintained the preferential
treatment for original patent applicants that had developed over the preceding
years. But the restructuring under the AIA introduced several changes to the
patentability of original patent applicants’ post-filing innovation.
Post-AIA § 102 does not have provisions corresponding to pre-AIA
§ 102(f) and (g),135 but it does contain a provision analogous to pre-AIA
§ 102(e). Post-AIA § 102(a) states that “[a] person shall be entitled to a patent
unless”:
(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or
in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective
filing date of the claimed invention; or
(2) the claimed invention was described in a patent issued . . . or in an
application for patent published or deemed published . . . in which the patent
or application, as the case may be, names another inventor and was effectively
filed before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.136

132. International applications and most foreign applications were already being published before 1999. The
original Patent Cooperation Treaty, signed in 1970, included a provision that international applications filed
under the treaty would publish shortly after eighteen months from their earliest priority dates. See Patent
Cooperation Treaty art. 21(2)(a), June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645. Almost all other countries also already
published patent applications eighteen months after the priority date. See Duffy et al., supra note 127, at 602–
03. An application corresponding to a U.S. patent application filed in one of these jurisdictions would thus result
in a publication eligible as prior art, even though the U.S. application was not itself published. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(a)–(b) (1994). One contemporary commentator estimated that about eighty percent of patents filed in the
United States in the early 1990s were available as publications (not necessarily in English) at eighteen months
after the priority date. See Carlos J. Moorhead, Improving Our Patent System for a Stronger America, 11 ST.
JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 465, 476 (1996). A more recent study found that about half of U.S. applications
filed in 1996 through 1999 that ultimately became patents had corresponding foreign applications. See Stuart
J.H. Graham & Deepak Hegde, Do Inventors Value Secrecy in Patenting? Evidence from the American
Inventor’s Protection Act of 1999, at 22 (Dec. 2, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2170555.
133. Section 122 allowed (and still allows) nonpublication requests if no corresponding application was
filed in a jurisdiction publishing applications after eighteen months. See 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(2)(B) (2000); 35
U.S.C. § 122(b)(2)(B) (2018). Thus, an applicant who was eligible to and did file a nonpublication request was
able to maintain the same supplementation grace period as before the implementation of pre-grant publication.
134. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). As before the AIA,
post-AIA § 102 describes different categories of prior art and establishes the novelty requirement, and post-AIA
§ 103 establishes the nonobviousness requirement. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–103 (2018).
135. Dennis Crouch, With 102(f) Eliminated, Is Inventorship Now Codified in 35 U.S.C. 101? Maybe, but
Not Restrictions on Patenting Obvious Variants of Derived Information, PATENTLY -O (Oct. 4, 2012),
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2012/10/with-102f-eliminated-is-inventorship-now-codified-in-35-usc-101.html
(discussing outstanding questions with respect to the elimination of section 102(f)); MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2151 (9th ed., rev. 2020) (discussing the elimination of sections 102(f) and (g)).
136. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2018) (emphasis added).
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Post-AIA § 102(a)(2) is thus analogous to pre-AIA § 102(e) in that earlierfiled, published applications and patents are prior art if they name “another
inventor.”137 The Federal Circuit has not addressed the meaning of “names
another inventor,” but the USPTO’s examination guidelines interpret “another
inventor” to mean any difference in inventorship.138 Post-AIA § 102(a)(1) is
analogous to pre-AIA § 102(a) in that applications and patents become prior art
once published, regardless of whether they are the work of the original
inventor(s) or not.
The AIA also contains a provision analogous to pre-AIA § 103(c) that
provides a safe harbor for commonly owned inventions and work under joint
research agreements (which this Article refers to as the “common control” safe
harbor). More specifically, post-AIA § 102(b)(2)(C) provides a carve-out from
prior art under § 102(a)(2) when “the subject matter disclosed and the claimed
invention, not later than the effective filing date of the claimed invention, were
owned by the same person or subject to an obligation of assignment to the same
person.”139 Post-AIA § 102(c) extends this carve-out to work under a joint
research agreement.140
Although these provisions are similar to their pre-AIA counterparts, there
are several important differences. First, under pre-AIA law, the common control
safe harbor was part of § 103, and thus applied only to minor supplementary
innovation.141 In contrast, under the AIA, the common control safe harbor is
found in § 102, thus applying to both deepening and minor supplementary
innovation.142
Second, under the AIA, the common control safe harbor applies if common
control exists when the second application is filed.143 This is later than under
pre-AIA law, where the safe harbor only applied if common control existed at
the time of the second invention.144 These two differences expand preferential
treatment for original patent applicants.145
137. Because the AIA converted the U.S. patent system to a first-to-file system, the relevant date for the
claimed invention is its “effective filing date,” not its date of invention. Cf. Merges, supra note 4, at 1027–30
(discussing these short-hand descriptors and explaining the complexities that are not captured by them).
138. See MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 135, § 2154.01(c) (“[I]f there is any
difference in inventive entity . . . the U.S. patent document satisfies the ‘names another inventor’
requirement . . . . [I]n the case of joint inventors, only one joint inventor needs to be different for the inventive
entities to be different.”).
139. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(2)(C) (2018).
140. See id. § 102(c).
141. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(c) (2006).
142. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(2)(C)–(c) (2018).
143. See id. § 102(b)(2)(C) (requiring common ownership or an obligation of assignment “not later than the
effective filing date of the claimed invention”).
144. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(c) (2006).
145. Cf. Rogers, supra note 18, at 377–78 (describing that post-AIA § 103(c) “increases the ability of
pharmaceutical companies to prevent existing information from being considered prior art”); Dennis Crouch,
Our Expanded Regime of Submarine Prior Art, PATENTLY-O (Apr. 22, 2015), https://patentlyo.com/patent/
2015/04/expanded-regime-submarine.html (describing the new exception as “more powerful” due in part to
expansion to novelty).
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A third difference increases the complexity of the supplementation grace
period’s duration. This increased complexity derives from the differences
between the pre-AIA and post-AIA one-year grace periods. Both pre-AIA and
post-AIA §§ 102–103 provide(d) forms of a one-year grace period after a
disclosure to file a patent application.146 Pre-AIA law provided the one-year
grace period regardless of the disclosure’s origin, but the extra year was only for
filing the later application; the invention still needed to occur before the
disclosure.147 The one-year grace period thus did not change the supplementary
innovation that could be patented (assuming timely filing). For a patent applicant
qualifying for preferential treatment, any supplementation grace period extended
until publication of the original application (or issuance if there was no pre-grant
publication) and was unaffected by the one-year grace period.148
Under post-AIA law, in contrast, when the one-year grace period applies,
it can extend the supplementation grace period. Yet, the availability of the oneyear grace period is more limited: the AIA only provides it if there is a disclosure
originating from an inventor.149 As a result, the supplementation grace period
can have two possible lengths when it exists: it can extend until the original
application’s publication (or issuance if there is no pre-grant publication); or,
when the one-year grace period applies, the supplementation grace period can
extend a year after the original application’s publication (or issuance). Notably,
even when there is common control, the length of the supplementation grace
period is variable depending on inventors’ contributions.150 This variability
reintroduces dividing lines between inventor groups, even within common
control, reminiscent of In re Land that had been largely eliminated for minor
innovation through the amendments of 1984, 1999, and 2004.151
Where does all of this historical layering of provisions regarding
preferential treatment and reorganization under the AIA leave us? Broadly
speaking, when a different party innovates beyond an original patent application,
that innovation must almost always be both novel and nonobvious as compared
146. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)–(b) (2006); 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1) (2018). This grace period is relatively unique
to U.S. patent law. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
147. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
148. When the original patent application was not “by another,” it did not qualify as prior art under § 102(e).
See id. § 102(e). In that case, the original patent application was prior art against deepening and minor
supplementary innovation that was invented after the original application’s publication or issuance (that is, a
supplementation grace period until publication or issuance for both deepening and minor supplementary
innovation). See id. § 102(a).
When the original patent application was “by another” but there was common control, it qualified as
prior art under § 102(e), but the safe harbor of § 103(c) applied. See id. §§ 102(e), 103(c). The original
application was thus prior art against deepening supplementary innovation that was invented after the original
application’s filing (that is, no supplementation grace period for deepening supplementary innovation), see id.
§ 102(e), and against minor supplementary innovation that was invented after the original application’s
publication or issuance (that is, a supplementation grace period until publication or issuance for minor
supplementary innovation). See id. § 102(a).
149. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1) (2018); Holbrook, supra note 2, at 1466–67.
150. See infra Part IV.A for a more detailed discussion of the supplementation grace period under the AIA.
151. See supra Part II.B, II.C.
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to the original patent application to be patentable. The original patent applicant,
however, is favored, such that it has the opportunity to protect post-filing
innovation that a different party could not patent. In particular, the preferential
treatment manifests as a supplementation grace period after the original
application’s filing. During the supplementation grace period, a second
application (which this Article refers to as a “supplementary application”152)
does not need to be novel or nonobvious over the original application. Thus,
during this period, eligible applicants can patent supplementary innovation that
would otherwise be unpatentable.

III. PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT’S EFFECTS
Though at least some form of preferential treatment for original patent
applicants has long been a feature of the U.S. patent system, preferential
treatment need not exist. Indeed, its scope varies around the world,153 and its
existence has been the subject of international debate. In efforts to harmonize
international patent laws beginning in the 1980s,154 one of the questions posed
to the World Intellectual Property Organization committee tasked with writing
a draft treaty was whether “pending patent applications of the same applicant
[should] be excluded from the state of the art,”155 but no consensus was
reached.156
As Part II described, much of U.S. patent law’s expansion of preferential
treatment for original patent applicants was driven by attempts to accommodate
collaborative research and development. Put another way, the expansion was
driven by the interests of innovators and organizations. But here I consider its

152. I have found one prior usage of this term in the same context. See Murashige, supra note 18, at 557
n.32 (describing an earlier scholarly article as “discussing the self-collision rule and proposals regarding the time
limit to file supplementary applications”) (citing Jochen Pagenberg, The WIPO Patent Harmonization Treaty,
19 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 1 (1991)).
153. For example, European patent law has no preferential treatment for original patent applicants.
However, European patent law excludes any unpublished application (regardless of whether it is the original
applicant’s) for inventive step analysis. See EURO. PAT. OFF., GUIDELINES FOR EXAMINATION § 5.1 (2019) (“The
state of the art also comprises the content of other European applications filed or validly claiming a priority date
earlier than—but published . . . on or after—the date of filing . . . . Such earlier applications are part of the state
of the art only when considering novelty and not when considering inventive step.”). Japanese patent law also
excludes all unpublished applications from prior art for inventive step. But Japan has preferential treatment for
original applicants: unpublished applications are also excluded from prior art for novelty if the inventor(s) or
applicant(s) are identical between the two applications. See Japanese Patent Act, art. 29-2 (“Where an invention
claimed in a patent application is identical with an invention or device (excluding an invention or device made
by the inventor of the invention . . . ) . . . of another application . . . which has been filed prior to the date of
filing . . . and published after . . . a patent shall not be granted . . . provided that this shall not apply where, at the
time of the filing . . . the applicant . . . and the applicant of the other application . . . are the same person.”)
(emphasis added).
154. Many parts of this effort ultimately stalled, but some harmonization was implemented, such as related
to patent term and patentable technology areas. See Patent Law Harmonization, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
https://www.wipo.int/patent-law/en/patent_law_harmonization.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2021).
155. Thomas, supra note 18, at 160.
156. See id. at 162–63.
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effects more broadly—can preferential treatment be justified as increasing
innovation?
Preferential treatment for original patent applicants creates the opportunity
for original applicants to receive more exclusivity than they would otherwise.
This exclusivity can be in the form of scope or term. Under current law, the term
of a patent is a fixed period from the application’s filing date, subject to certain
adjustments.157 Because a supplementary application will have a later filing date
than the original application, any resulting supplementary patent will typically
expire later.158 Thus, patenting supplementary innovation can delay the end of
patent exclusivity. And when the innovation is broadening supplementary
innovation,159 the additional exclusivity is also in the form of scope.
Unlike most follow-on innovation, where the “right to patent
improvements on a technology is a common right,”160 the additional term and/or
scope of exclusivity available to the original patent applicant through a
supplementary application is not available to others. Others can prevent the
original patent applicant from obtaining the additional exclusivity by creating
intervening prior art, but they cannot obtain patent rights to supplementary
innovation.161
Theories proposed to justify patent exclusivity generally can provide a
framework for analyzing whether the additional exclusivity created by
preferential treatment is likely to contribute to innovation. Two theories (both
subject to much debate) are most commonly put forth to justify the patent
system: the disclosure theory and the incentive theory.162 Under the disclosure
theory, patents promote further innovation by disseminating existing innovation
upon which the further innovation can be built.163 Under the incentive theory,
157. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2018). The term is twenty years from the application’s effective filing date,
excluding provisional applications—that is, from the earliest nonprovisional application to which the application
claims priority. See id. § 154(a). The twenty-year term is sometimes lengthened to account for delays within the
USPTO (“patent term adjustment”) or premarket regulatory review (“patent term extension”), and/or shortened
by terminal disclaimers. See id. § 154(b) (patent term adjustment); id. § 156 (patent term extension); id. § 253
(disclaimers). Patents issuing from applications filed before June 8, 1995, had a term of seventeen years from
issuance. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988); Mark A. Lemley, An Empirical Study of the Twenty-Year Patent Term,
22 AIPLA Q.J. 369, 370 (1994).
158. See infra Part IV.B.1.a.
159. See supra Part I.B.2.
160. Duffy, supra note 16, at 488.
161. Another party who did not create intervening prior art but who used supplementary innovation
commercially could have prior user rights. 35 U.S.C. § 273 provides a defense to infringement of a patent for a
person who commercially used the invention in the United States at least a year before the patent’s filing date or
a public disclosure by the patentee. See 35 U.S.C. § 273(a) (2018).
162. Kevin Emerson Collins, The Structural Implications of Inventors’ Disclosure Obligations, 69 VAND.
L. REV. 1785, 1786 (2016); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 545, 554–61 (2012).
163. See J. Jonas Anderson, Nontechnical Disclosure, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1585–86 (2016); Ouellette,
supra note 162, at 546. The benefit to others from patent disclosure has been widely questioned; some scholars
critique disclosure theory itself, whereas others defend it but point to reasons why patent disclosures are not
useful in their current form. See, e.g., Alan Devlin, The Misunderstood Function of Disclosure in Patent Law,
23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 401 (2010); Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539 (2009); Timothy
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patent-based exclusivity incentivizes innovation. There are divergent views on
how this works: one view is that the possibility of a patent as a reward
incentivizes innovation occurring before the patent is awarded—what Mark
Lemley has termed an “ex ante” justification for patents; another view is that
patents incentivize later development or commercialization of inventions—what
Professor Lemley has termed an “ex post” justification.164 Both the disclosure
and incentive theories can frame considerations of the potential effects on
innovation of the additional patent exclusivity generated by preferential
treatment.
A. DISCLOSURE THEORY
1. Increased Disclosure of Supplementary Innovation
Preferential treatment increases the disclosure of supplementary innovation
via the patent system. Most patent applicants are incentivized to disclose their
innovation via the patent system only if it is likely to be patentable. If they
disclose unpatentable innovation in a patent application, the application’s
publication will disclose the innovation to the public without the applicant
receiving any exclusivity in return. Supplementary innovation is thus likely to
be disclosed only when the original application is not prior art. Without any
preferential treatment for original patent applicants, then, supplementary
innovation would rarely be disclosed.165 Thus, preferential treatment encourages

R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123 (2006); Seymore, supra note 24. Common
criticisms include that the quality of patent disclosure is too low to be useful to other innovators and that
innovation disclosed by patents would have been disclosed anyway—for example, through reverse engineering
of the associated product. Ouellette, supra note 162, at 558, 560. Professor Ouellette has argued that the evidence
that innovators use patent disclosures is stronger than others have suggested, and she and others have provided
additional evidence of patents’ use as a source of technical information and of their role in cumulative innovation.
See, e.g., id. at 561–80; Jeffrey L. Furman, Markus Nagler & Martin Watzinger, Disclosure and Subsequent
Innovation: Evidence from the Patent Depository Library Program (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper
No. 24660, 2018). Other scholars have argued that the value of patent disclosure is broader than as a source of
technical information, and that patents allow for other valuable forms of disclosure. See, e.g., Anderson, supra;
Chien, supra note 29; Jason Rantanen, Peripheral Disclosure, 74 U. PITT. L. REV . 1 (2012).
164. See Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 129, 130 (2004). The terminology for these theories varies. Some scholars, for example, use “incentive”
theory to describe only the ex ante view and describe the ex post view as “commercialization” theory. See, e.g.,
Anderson, supra note 163, at 1581–89 (describing the three main patent theories as “the incentive to invent
theory, the incentive to disclose theory, and the prospect or commercialization theory”); Camilla A. Hrdy,
Commercialization Awards, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 13, 26 (2015) (describing the three traditional justifications for
patents as generating incentives to “invent,” “disclose,” and “commercialize”).
165. Cf. Burk, supra note 29, at 1622 (“[T]he inventor’s understanding will likely advance, not just during
the lifetime of the patent, but during the course of the patent application process. The best that can be done with
incremental changes to the technology is to file continuations in part (‘CIPs’) . . . . But if the new discoveries or
understanding are not themselves patentable, they will not be reflected in CIPs and will go undisclosed.”). But
a valid patent is not the goal of every patent applicant. Some applicants hope simply to obtain a patent, regardless
of whether it would likely be invalidated if later challenged. Even an invalid patent can still provide a competitive
advantage, see infra note 176, and the USPTO regularly grants patents that could not or do not survive
challenges. See Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation
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original patent applicants to disclose this post-filing innovation in exchange for
patent rights.
Information about supplementary innovation can be valuable to other
innovators. Because original patent applications are filed early in the innovation
process, they usually do not describe complete, optimized inventions,166 often
use “vague and general” language,167 and may not contain any explanation of
how inventions work.168 Later innovation, including supplementary innovation,
can fill in the details. This information can help others understand or
successfully implement the invention and can help put others on more equal
footing with original patent applicants with respect to developing subsequent
innovation.169
Disclosure of this information through supplementary applications can be
particularly valuable when information about supplementary innovation is
costly for others to obtain in other ways.170 For instance, deepening
supplementary innovation explaining how an existing invention works may be
costly for others to recreate, but also particularly valuable for fostering
subsequent innovation.171 Moreover, without the possibility of patent protection
afforded by preferential treatment, original patent applicants may choose to
protect supplementary innovation through trade secrecy when they can.172 As

Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 943, 944–46 (2004); Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV.
1495, 1500 (2001); R. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2135,
2145–46 (2009). Other patent applicants’ primary goal may not even be to obtain a patent. For example, filing
a patent application can serve a signaling function to potential investors or acquirers. Cf. Simon, supra note 28,
at 763 (describing the importance of patent protection to medical device startups in seeking investments,
including “providing a useful signal to investors about . . . resource allocation and the experience and
sophistication of the executive team”). Applicants may also file patent applications to create prior art against
competitors’ inventions. See Gideon Parchomovsky, Publish or Perish, 98 MICH. L. REV. 926, 927–29 (2000)
(arguing that firms sometimes engage in “preemptive publication” to adversely “affect the patentability of their
rivals’ inventions by altering the state of the prior art”). But see Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Promise and Perils
of Strategic Publication to Create Prior Art: A Response to Professor Parchomovsky, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2358,
2370 (2000) (arguing that “[i]t is implausible that rival pharmaceutical firms . . . would utilize preemptive
publication,” and “[a]bsent evidence that commercial rivals are actually deploying the strategy that
Parchomovsky attributes to them, it seems premature to fine-tune doctrine to take such a possibility into
account”).
166. See supra notes 23–30 and accompanying text.
167. Cotropia, supra note 6, at 116–19.
168. See Seymore, supra note 51, at 719–21.
169. Cf. id. at 710 (“[I]t is easier to develop new drugs when researchers understand how old ones work.”).
170. Professor Ouellette has argued that “few inventions are ‘self-disclosing’ at zero cost,” pointing to the
work of other scholars, including Jeanne Fromer and Alan Devlin. Ouellette, supra note 162, at 560–61.
171. See Seymore, supra note 51, at 710, 723–24 (discussing how disclosure of information about how an
invention works would be “an enormous” public benefit, and how in cases of inventions with “opaque”
mechanisms, “elucidating this information through reverse engineering is difficult, if not impossible (at least
without considerable effort or expense)” and could involve experimentation that might require a license).
172. Cf. Duffy, supra note 13, at 366 (“[I]f pioneering patentees are denied improvement patents, the
improvements may be maintained as trade secrets in situations where disclosure would be more socially
beneficial.”).
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others have noted, for example, post-filing innovation regarding the “best mode”
of carrying out an invention is often held as a trade secret.173
2. Effects on Original Applications: Timing and Content
Preferential treatment also affects the timing and content of the original
application. This is because its timing and content are not fixed—they are
influenced by an applicant’s knowledge that a later supplementary application
can be filed.
In particular, preferential treatment can encourage the original patent
applicant to file its first application earlier, since the applicant knows that there
is the opportunity for later supplementation. This can benefit others by leading
to earlier public access to information about the innovation, as well as earlier
expiration of the original patent.174
But filing the original patent application earlier also shifts its content earlier
along the innovation timeline. As a result, the original application’s disclosure
may be less useful than it would have been without preferential treatment. Some
of the information disclosed in a supplementary application may be information
that, absent preferential treatment, would have been disclosed in the original
application itself. Because the availability of preferential treatment does not
differ between at-fault and no-fault supplementary innovation,175 in some cases
preferential treatment may even encourage applicants to file their original
applications before it is clear that the utility and disclosure requirements are met,
in order to establish an early filing date. Relying on a supplementary application
to correct any defects in an original application is risky but may still be a
valuable strategy for some applicants.176
173. See W. Nicholson Price II, Expired Patents, Trade Secrets, and Stymied Competition, 92 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1611, 1618 (2017) (describing, with respect to keeping the best mode, including a subsequently
discovered best mode, as a trade secret, that “[i]nventors know about and use this complementarity; law firms
encourage it”). Patent applicants are required to disclose what the inventor believes is the “best mode” of carrying
out the invention, 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2018), but only as of the date the patent application is filed. See SpectraPhysics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1535 (Fed. Cir. 1987). The best mode requirement has been
substantially weakened under the AIA: failure to disclose the best mode is not a basis for invalidity as a defense
to patent infringement. See 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(3)(A) (2018); Brian J. Love & Christopher B. Seaman, Best Mode
Trade Secrets, 15 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 8–11 (2012); Ryan Vacca, Patent Reform and Best Mode: A Signal to
the Patent Office or a Step Toward Elimination?, 75 ALB. L. REV. 279, 290–93 (2012).
174. John Duffy has argued with respect to the prospect theory of patents, which favors early, broad patent
rights, see infra notes 189–195 and accompanying text, that the “prospect features of the patent system are
useful . . . because they channel rent-seeking behavior into . . . early patenting—which is socially desirable
because it dissipates private but not social rents.” Duffy, supra note 16, at 464. As a result of early patenting,
“the patent will expire sooner and, accordingly, more of the benefits associated with the invention will be
captured by consumers rather than by the patentee.” Id. at 467.
175. See infra Part IV.A.
176. The supplementary application will have a later priority date. The risks thus include that the
supplementary application’s patentability will be subject to others’ intervening prior art and the original
applicant’s own non-patent disclosures; and that patent rights could be lost completely in foreign jurisdictions
with absolute novelty rules. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. But filing an early original application
can nonetheless play a strategic role, especially for patent applicants for whom the appearance of potential patent
rights is more meaningful than valid granted rights. For example, even pending claims (that is, claims not
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On the other hand, preferential treatment may also improve the quality of
the original patent application’s disclosure. When original applicants cannot file
patentable applications on post-filing innovation, they may try to use their
existing applications to draft new claims covering the post-filing innovation.
This is possible because the claims of a patent application define the boundaries
of the exclusivity being sought by the patent applicant,177 but the application
generally describes much more in its complete disclosure than the claims.178
After filing, the disclosure cannot be changed, but the claims can be changed
within the bounds of the disclosure.179 They can be changed either in the original
application itself, or in a subsequent “continuing” application, which is treated
as having the same filing date as the original.180
Original patent applicants can thus use their existing applications to draft
new claims to patent post-filing innovation, as long as the claims are sufficiently
supported.181 Although commentators have critiqued such “mining” of claims
(primarily in the context of claims to cover competitors),182 the Federal Circuit
has made clear that applicants are free to pursue any claim with sufficient
support in the disclosure as filed, even if the real genesis of the claim post-dates
filing.183

approved by the USPTO) can be valuable to the applicant and detrimental to a competitor when seeking funding.
Cf. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical
Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 699 (1998) (“[F]irms raise capital on the basis of the inchoate rights preserved by
patent filings. In effect, each potential patent creates a specter of rights that may be larger than the actual rights,
if any, eventually conferred by the PTO. Worked into the calculations of both risk-taking investors and riskaverse product developers, these overlapping patent filings may compound the obstacles to developing new
products.”). Similarly, if a patent is listed in the Orange Book as covering a drug product or method of using
it—regardless of whether the claims are valid—approval from the FDA for generic versions can be delayed. See
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2018); Feldman, supra note 40, at 600; Dmitry Karshtedt, The More Things
Change: Improvement Patents, Drug Modifications, and the FDA, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1129, 1145 (2019).
177. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372–73 (1996).
178. See Chiang, supra note 3, at 527. The disclosure is made up of a description of the invention (the
“specification”), figures if necessary, and one or more claims. See 35 U.S.C. § 111 (2018); id. § 112
(specification); id. § 113 (drawings); id. § 111(a)(3) (claims).
179. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
180. See 35 U.S.C. § 120 (2018); Chiang, supra note 3, at 533–34; Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore,
Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63, 68 (2004).
181. See Cotropia, supra note 6, at 96, 101–02. Sufficient support requires that the application’s disclosure
enable a person skilled in the art to make and use the claimed invention, see In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 735
(Fed. Cir. 1988), and that it conveys to that hypothetical person that the inventor had “possession” of the claimed
invention at the time of filing. “Possession” can be established merely by writing down the invention in the
patent application at filing. See Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351–52 (Fed. Cir. 2010);
Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563–64 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
182. See, e.g., Chiang, supra note 3, at 544–45 (describing it as leading to “very little” increase in incentives
to invent or disclose, while increasing social costs of the patent monopoly); Herbert Hovenkamp, Notice and
Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. L. REV. ONLINE 221, 228–31 (2011) (describing it as “threaten[ing] to deliver broader
patent protection” than needed to incentivize innovation and increasing notice problems for potential infringers);
Lemley & Moore, supra note 180, at 78–79 (describing it as seeming “fundamentally unfair” and inconsistent
with incentive theory).
183. See Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 874 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Tun-Jen
Chiang has written that, while “virtually never invoked,” there is a doctrine of “dishonest claiming” that renders
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To facilitate later mining of the disclosure for post-filing innovation,
original patent applicants are incentivized to use broad, vague language184 and
include undeveloped, speculative post-filing innovation in the original patent
application.185 This can obscure the actual invention and contribute to the
opacity of patent disclosures, making their content less informative for other
innovators. Moreover, these broad, vague, speculative disclosures can reduce
incentives for future innovation by preventing others from patenting similar
innovation later.186
Supplementation grace periods relieve some of the pressure on applicants
to try to capture post-filing innovation through their original patent applications.
This, in turn, can improve the quality of the original applications’ disclosures.
That said, much of the pressure to predict post-filing innovation in original
applications remains, even with preferential treatment. An original patent
application that successfully predicts post-filing innovation will have an earlier
filing date than any supplementary application would; this can be advantageous
both for improving the original applicant’s own exclusivity position (by
antedating more prior art) and for thwarting others’ exclusivity (by creating
more prior art against follow-on innovators’ would-be patentable innovation).
B. INCENTIVE THEORY
As described briefly above, incentive-based theories of patent law broadly
divide into those focused on patents’ influence on innovator behavior before
patent rights are awarded (“ex ante” theories) and those focused on patents’
influence on innovator behavior after patent rights are awarded (“ex post”
theories).187 The classic justification for patents is based on an ex ante theory:
patents encourage innovation by rewarding innovation after it is created.188
a claim invalid when a patentee is “being manifestly dishonest, and does not regard the new claim as being part
of his invention.” See Chiang, supra note 3, at 531 n.37.
184. See Cotropia, supra note 6, at 116–17 (“The need to file early also prompts the inventor to intentionally
draft the patent application . . . in vague and general terms. The specification needs to be intentionally general
so that it can support later-filed continuations.”).
185. Cf. Tom Brody, Categories of Anti-Obviousness Case Law: (1) Laundry Lists; (2) Redundant
Advantages; and (3) Advantage Not Needed and Not Relevant, 17 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 395,
408–59 (2018) (discussing case law relating to laundry lists in prior art references).
186. For example, Benjamin Roin has described in the context of drugs:
Not knowing which compound they will end up developing, the pharmaceutical companies draft
their initial patent applications broadly to disclose . . . as many of the compounds under
consideration as possible. As their research progresses . . . they narrow their patent claims and
allow many of the originally disclosed compounds to fall into the public domain. . . . [T]heir prior
disclosure will likely defeat any later claim of novelty, thus preventing them from being patented.
Roin, supra note 18, at 529 (footnotes omitted). Sean Seymore has described more generally that patents
claiming “undeveloped or underdeveloped subject matter” can “create roadblocks for subsequent inventors who
can enable the claimed subject matter.” Seymore, supra note 62, at 1045. Janet Freilich has similarly described
how the speculative disclosures in prophetic examples may create “an innovation dead zone.” Freilich, supra
note 28, at 669.
187. See Lemley, supra note 164, at 130.
188. See Duffy, supra note 16, at 439–40; Lemley, supra note 164, at 129–30.
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Others take an ex post view: patent exclusivity allows inventions to be developed
and commercialized.189 The prominent early articulation of an ex post theory
was the “prospect” theory set forth by Edmund Kitch in 1977, according to
which broad, early rights would encourage later innovation by coordinating
resources and effort.190
Ex ante and ex post theories suggest different roles for patents in
supplementary innovation. Under ex ante theories, the line between patentable
and unpatentable innovation should be drawn between innovation requiring and
not requiring patent-based reward incentives. To the extent that the
nonobviousness doctrine approximates this line, patent-based exclusivity is not
justified for minor supplementary innovation because the innovation should
come about naturally without a patent reward.191 To the extent that anticipated
innovation should already exist, there is similarly no reason to promote
deepening supplementary innovation via patents.192
Under many ex post theories, however, patent rights ought to have greater
scope.193 These broad rights would protect follow-on innovation, including
innovation—like supplementary innovation—that would, under ex ante theories,
be unpatentable standing alone. Professor Kitch argued that patentees should be
given these broad rights early in the innovation process to encourage the
patentee’s development of the technology “without fear that the fruits of the
investment will produce unpatentable information appropriable by
competitors.”194 He argued that “[i]n the case of many patents, extensive
development is required before any commercial application is possible . . . . The
investments may be required simply to apply existing technology to the
manufacture and design of the product and be so mechanical in their application
as to be unpatentable.”195
189. Lemley, supra note 164, at 130; see generally Hrdy, supra note 164, at 27–41 (describing
commercialization theories).
190. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977); see
Duffy, supra note 16, at 440–41; Hrdy, supra note 164, at 27–28; Lemley, supra note 164, at 132–33.
191. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 9, at 608–09; Michael B. Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The
Inducement Standard of Patentability, 120 YALE L.J. 1590, 1594, 1596 (2011) (explaining that “despite its
apparent promise as the theoretical basis” for the nonobviousness doctrine, the inducement standard “has
achieved only a modicum of influence,” and arguing that it should be “the touchstone for understanding and
refining the obviousness doctrine”).
192. See Seymore, supra note 62, at 1033; accord Roin, supra note 18, at 518 (describing this rationale as
“so widely accepted” as to be “almost canonical”).
193. See Lemley, supra note 164, at 131 (“The new ex post justifications, by contrast [to ex ante
justifications], endorse a greater and perhaps unlimited duration and scope of intellectual property rights.”).
However, not all ex post theories support broad patent rights. See Hrdy, supra note 164, at 31 (describing postKitch commercialization theories and stating that “[n]one necessarily turns on the importance of broad, early
patents held by single firms, and some directly contradict prospect theory’s assumptions”).
194. Kitch, supra note 190, at 276; see Duffy, supra note 16, at 440.
195. Kitch, supra note 190, at 276. There are limitations regarding prospect theory’s explanatory power
regarding the treatment of more significant follow-on innovation. John Duffy has argued that Kitch’s articulation
of the prospect theory failed to adequately address the fact that others can acquire rights to patentable
improvements within the patent’s claims. As such, granting the pioneer patentee broad, early rights would not
allow complete control and coordination of development. Duffy, supra note 16, at 455–58, 483–91; see also
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Preferential treatment for original patent applicants creates overlap
between the ex ante and ex post perspectives because, in effect, it allows patent
rights to be awarded over a period of time, rather than at a single moment. Patent
rights on supplementary innovation have an “ex post” effect relative to the
original patent application, and an “ex ante” effect relative to the supplementary
patent application. That is, viewed in ex ante terms, preferential treatment
creates a patent reward for the original applicant for supplementary innovation
where there otherwise would not have been one, since it transforms unpatentable
innovation into patentable innovation. Viewed in ex post terms, preferential
treatment creates an option (subject to any other prior art) when an original
patent application is filed. That option can be exercised later by the original
patent applicant to protect supplementary innovation that would have been
unpatentable absent the preferential treatment.
The effect of the reward or option depends on whether the supplementary
innovation is within the scope of the original application’s patentable claims.
When the supplementary innovation is within the scope of patentable claims of
the original application—that is, the innovation is encompassed supplementary
innovation196—the potential effect is smaller because the original patent
applicant can already capture the value even without specific patent rights.197 An
effect due to scope of exclusivity is thus limited, but the added term may give
value to the reward or option.198 When, on the other hand, the supplementary
innovation is not within the scope of patentable claims of the original
application—that is, when the innovation is broadening supplementary
innovation199—the potential effect of the reward or option is larger, since there
can be additional term and scope.
1. An Ex Ante View
By providing a patent reward for anticipated or obvious innovation,
preferential treatment appears inconsistent with the classic ex ante justification
for patents.200 But the novelty and nonobviousness doctrines do not perfectly
divide innovation that would and would not come about naturally without a
patent reward. Preferential treatment’s rewards for supplementary innovation
Lemley, supra note 17, at 1008–10 (discussing the relationship between the original patentee’s and later
improver’s rights when the improvement is “significant”).
196. See supra Part I.B.2.
197. See Duffy, supra note 16, at 484–87 (illustrating how broad patents that encompass improvements
allow pioneer patentees to capture the full value of unpatentable improvements that can be freely appropriated,
and allow pioneer patentees to coordinate investment in unpatentable improvements that cannot be freely
appropriated); Lemley, supra note 17, at 1008 (describing how “[t]he law offers no protection to . . . minor
improvers,” and “if the minor improvement does turn out to be infringing . . . the patent owner captures the value
of the improvement”).
198. But a supplementary patent’s claims covering narrower, encompassed supplementary innovation can
have some value deriving from their scope. For example, narrower claims can serve as insurance in case of later
invalidation of the original patent’s claims.
199. See supra Part I.B.2.
200. See supra notes 191–192 and accompanying text.
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can be desirable when socially valuable innovation is deemed unpatentable but
will not come about naturally.
Other scholars have argued for providing corrective patent incentives for
anticipated or obvious innovation in this situation. For example, Benjamin Roin
has described that without patent protection (or the expectation of patent
protection), drug companies are unlikely to invest in post-discovery
development.201 Yet, he argues, “the nonobviousness requirement withholds
patent protection from the drugs that seem most promising before they have been
developed.”202 He thus proposes rewards in the form of FDA-administered
exclusivity periods to “fill the gaps left by the novelty and nonobviousness
requirements.”203 Sean Seymore has similarly argued that “the current novelty
rules prevent many socially valuable inventions from reaching the public.”204 He
has proposed another form of corrective reward: he suggests allowing a
“reinventor” to receive a period of exclusivity for inventions anticipated by
earlier expired patents but not adequately disclosed.205
Preferential treatment offers another approach to incentivizing
supplementary innovation. Rather than targeting a corrective patent reward to a
particular type of supplementary innovation (as Professors Roin and Seymore
suggest), preferential treatment targets the corrective reward to a particular
innovator—the original applicant. This targeting makes sense when the original
applicant is best situated to pursue the post-filing innovation.206 Limiting
exclusivity for supplementary innovation to original applicants can also avoid
innovation-hampering patent thickets that patentability requirements prevent,207
depending on how original applicants are defined.208 But because the patent
rewards are not targeted to a particular type of supplementary innovation, they
may not only incentivize socially valuable innovation, but also push original

201. See Roin, supra note 18, at 545–47. For a discussion of other, non-patent incentives for
pharmaceuticals, see Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Innovation Policy Pluralism, 128 YALE L.J.
544, 593–601 (2019).
202. Roin, supra note 18, at 531. He argues that “because the nonobviousness test focuses on whether the
therapeutic properties of a drug are expected and not on whether the drug is socially valuable, the PTO and
courts have rejected patent applications on drugs even though they are expected to be superior to known
treatments and thus are expected to have great social value if developed.” Id. at 536.
203. Id. at 564.
204. See Seymore, supra note 62, at 1031.
205. See id. at 1034.
206. In the context of drugs, Dmitry Karshtedt has argued that typically “the original drug’s sponsor will
control both the pioneering drug and its improvements” not simply because it owns the pioneer patent, but also
because of its “immense head start” due to undisclosed know-how and data. Karshtedt, supra note 176, at 1158.
207. See supra note 12 and accompanying text; cf. Duffy, supra note 8, at 16 (describing, with respect to
the pre-AIA system, that the nonobviousness requirement serves to allocate rewards among inventors, but when
there is common ownership between applications, “allocating rewards among parties is not a concern,” so the
“law thus eliminates the nonobviousness requirement in those circumstances and allows the granting of
patents”).
208. See infra Part IV.C.4 for a discussion of how to define original applicants eligible for preferential
treatment.
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patent applicants to channel resources toward insignificant incremental
innovation.209
2. An Ex Post View
Preferential treatment’s offer of greater exclusivity on later stages of
research, development, and commercialization is more obviously consistent
with many ex post theories. Preferential treatment can give original patent
applicants broader and longer patent rights, while also promoting early
acquisition of original patent rights, consistent with prospect theory. But unlike
the broad, early rights envisioned under prospect theory, preferential treatment
for original patent applicants does not grant the full scope of rights up front.
Rather, it permits the original applicant to subsequently broaden its rights in
exchange for disclosing the supplementary innovation (and subject to any other
prior art). This contributes to patents’ role in disclosing innovation to other
innovators in a way that early broad patent rights cannot.210

IV. RECONSIDERING PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT
Although preferential treatment for original applicants can help the patent
system accommodate dynamic innovation processes and can increase disclosure
and innovation incentives for post-filing innovation, the current complex and
haphazardly developed statutory framework is not well-tailored to achieving
these potential benefits. This Part first explains in more detail the current AIA
framework for when supplementary innovation is patentable. It then considers
the framework’s limitations and how the piecemeal formation of preferential
treatment has departed from the original policy goals and reintroduced problems
that had been mitigated by earlier statutory amendments. Finally, it offers an
alternative approach.
A. PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT UNDER THE AIA
Whether supplementary innovation can be patented in any particular
circumstance (subject to any other prior art) under the AIA depends on four
factors. The first of these is ownership or control of the original and
supplementary applications: Is there common control?211 The second and third
relate to the individuals involved in the innovation: How much overlap is there,
if any, between the inventors of the original and supplementary applications?
209. Cf. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 9, at 609 (“[G]ranting patents to obvious developments may
compromise the incentives that the patent system provides to develop nonobvious inventions.”).
210. Prospect theory has been described as generally “discount[ing] much of the teaching function of the
patent system,” with disclosure being “less about teaching follow-on innovators and more about creating legal
entitlements.” Anderson, supra note 163, at 1587–89 (discussing the relationship between prospect theory and
disclosure).
211. See supra notes 139–140 and accompanying text. When there is common control, an original
application that would be prior art under § 102(a)(2) is excluded under the safe harbor of § 102(b)(2)(C)–(c).
See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2018).
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Does the relevant disclosure in the original application originate from an
inventor of the supplementary application?212 These first three factors determine
whether a supplementation grace period exists, and if so, its duration. The fourth
factor is timing: What is the delay between the filing of the original and
supplementary applications? Put another way, does the supplementary
application fall within the original application’s supplementation grace period?
Broadly speaking, the closer the relationship between the original and
supplementary applications as defined by the first three factors, the longer the
supplementation grace period. When the relationship between the original and
supplementary applications is strongest, supplementary innovation is patentable
(subject to any other prior art) as long as it is filed within a year of the publication
of the original application—that is, the supplementation grace period extends a
year beyond publication of the original application.213 This is the case when the
relevant disclosure in the original application originates from an inventor of the
supplementary application, whether or not the applications are commonly
controlled, and regardless of inventorship.214
In other instances, the supplementary innovation is patentable (subject to
any other prior art) as long as it is not filed after publication of the original
application—that is, the supplementation grace period extends to the publication
of the original application. This is the case when the relevant disclosure in the
original application does not originate from an inventor of the supplementary
application, but the applications are commonly controlled, regardless of
inventorship.215 This is also the case when the relevant disclosure in the original
212. When the inventorship is identical between the original and supplementary applications, the original
application is not prior art under § 102(a)(2) as naming “another inventor.” Id. § 102(a)(2). When the relevant
disclosure in the original application originates from an inventor of the supplementary application, the original
application is excluded from § 102(a)(1) and/or § 102(a)(2) prior art under the exceptions of § 102(b)(1)(A) and
§ 102(b)(2)(A), respectively. See id. Because inventorship is based on the claims, it is possible for disclosure in
the original application to originate from someone who is not named as an inventor on that application. See supra
note 77.
213. The discussion in this and the following paragraphs assumes that the original application publishes in
pre-grant form before it becomes a granted patent. If the original application becomes a granted patent without
publishing in pre-grant form, the supplementation grace period is tied to the date of grant.
214. When the inventorship is identical between the two applications, the original application is not prior
art under § 102(a)(2) because it does not name “another inventor.” 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2). As such, the original
application is prior art only if it qualifies under § 102(a)(1). If the supplementary application is filed within a
year of the original application’s publication, the exception of § 102(b)(1)(A) applies. See id. § 102(b)(1)(A).
When the inventorship is not identical between the two applications, the original application is not prior
art under § 102(a)(2) because the exception of § 102(b)(2)(A) applies. See id. § 102(b)(2)(A). (And, if the
applications are commonly controlled, the exception of § 102(b)(2)(C)–(c) also applies. See id. § 102(b), (c).)
Thus, again, the original application is only prior art if it qualifies under § 102(a)(1).
215. When the inventorship is identical between the two applications, the original application is not prior
art under § 102(a)(2) because it does not name “another inventor.” See id. § 102(a)(2). When the inventorship is
not identical, the original application is not prior art under § 102(a)(2) because the common control exception
of § 102(b)(2)(C)–(c) applies. See id. §102(b), (c). In either case, the original application is typically prior art
under § 102(a)(1) when it publishes, since the exception under § 102(b)(1)(A) for disclosure originating from
an inventor of the supplementary application does not apply. See id. § 102(a), (b). In some cases, however,
another exception under § 102(b)(1)(B) may apply. See id. § 102(b)(1)(B).
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application does not originate from an inventor of the supplementary application
and the applications are not commonly controlled, but the applications have
identical inventorship.216
When the relationship between the original and supplementary applications
is weak, the supplementary innovation is not patentable. In particular, no
supplementation grace period typically exists if the relevant disclosure in the
original application does not originate from an inventor of the supplementary
application, there is no common control, and the applications do not have
identical inventorship. This is true even if the applications have partially
overlapping inventorship.217
There are other doctrinal nuances and factual scenarios not addressed here.
But even considering only the simple fact patterns above, it should be clear that
the patentability of supplementary innovation in any given situation depends
primarily on complicated line-drawing based on who is involved in the original
and supplementary innovation and when the supplementary application is filed.
But the patentability of supplementary innovation does not depend on what the
supplementary innovation is. That is, no distinction is made between minor and
deepening supplementary innovation, encompassed and broadening
supplementary innovation, or no-fault and at-fault supplementary innovation.
B. LIMITATIONS OF THE AIA FRAMEWORK
1. Lost Correspondence to Double Patenting
As Part II described, as Congress created and expanded the safe harbor
under § 103 for commonly controlled innovation, it made clear its expectation
that the safe harbor would be counterbalanced by expanded application of
double patenting.218 This quid pro quo made sense in its original context of the
1984 amendments. There, Congress was reacting to In re Bass, where the CCPA
had used the “prior invention” of an earlier-issued patent as § 102(g) prior art in
nonobviousness analysis under § 103.219 Obviousness-type double patenting
similarly asks whether claims are obvious in view of the reference patent’s
claims—not its disclosure as a whole.220 Thus, replacing § 102(g)-based
216. The original application is not prior art under § 102(a)(2), since it does not name “another inventor,”
but it is typically prior art under § 102(a)(1) when it publishes, since the exception under § 102(b)(1)(A) for
disclosure originating from an inventor of the supplementary application does not apply. See id. § 102(a), (b). In
some cases, however, another exception under § 102(b)(1)(B) may apply. See id. § 102(b)(1)(B). Such scenarios
are likely to be rare.
217. The original application is typically prior art retroactive to its filing date upon publication, since it
“names another inventor” under § 102(a)(2), and the exceptions under § 102(b)(2)(A) and § 102(b)(2)(C)–(c)
for origination from an inventor and common control, respectively, do not apply. See id. § 102(a), (b). In some
cases, however, another exception under § 102(b)(2)(B) may apply. See id. § 102(b)(2)(B).
218. See supra Part II.B, II.C.
219. See In re Bass, 474 F.2d 1276, 1286–88 (C.C.P.A. 1973); supra notes 79–104 and accompanying text.
220. See Geneva Pharm., Inc. v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 349 F.3d 1373, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing Gen.
Foods Corp. v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH, 972 F.2d 1272, 1281–82 (Fed. Cir. 1992)) (“Because
nonstatutory double patenting compares earlier and later claims, an earlier patent’s disclosure is not available to

606

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 72:565

obviousness with obviousness-type double patenting and terminal disclaimers
restored the pre-Bass availability of additional patent scope, but not patent term,
for certain later inventions.
But once the safe harbor under § 103 was expanded to § 102(e) art in
1999,221 obviousness-type double patenting and terminal disclaimers sometimes
failed to restrict additional patent term. The entire disclosure, not just the claims,
of an earlier-filed application is prior art under pre-AIA § 102(e) and
corresponding post-AIA § 102(a)(2).222 A patent application’s disclosure is
usually much more extensive than its claims.223 As such, the expanded safe
harbor can result in a supplementary patent to which obviousness-type double
patenting over the original patent does not apply. When there is no obviousnesstype double patenting, no terminal disclaimer will be required in the
supplementary patent.224
Allowing a supplementary application to issue without a terminal
disclaimer leads to the loss of three benefits: a limitation on additional patent
term, forward-looking common control requirements, and documentation in the
record of the relationship between applications.
An example helps illustrate the loss of these benefits. Consider
AstraZeneca’s patents covering the recently approved drug Lokelma®, used to
treat hyperkalemia (elevated potassium in the blood).225 Patents resulting from
several different applications have been listed in the Food and Drug
Administration’s Orange Book as covering Lokelma® or a method of using it,226
including patents resulting from U.S. Application No. 13/371,080 and U.S.
Application No. 14/060,279.227 Although it is difficult to know with certainty, it
show nonstatutory double patenting.”). The specification is only considered to the extent that it is used to
interpret the claims. See Sun Pharm. Indus., Ltd. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 611 F.3d 1381, 1387–88 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
221. See supra Part II.C.1.
222. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) (2000); 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (2018).
223. See supra notes 177–178 and accompanying text.
224. Douglas Rogers has made a similar observation about double patenting doctrine’s scope. See Rogers,
supra note 18. He has argued that “the Federal Circuit has improperly limited double patenting by determining
the inventions involved through comparison only of the patents’ claims and not of their specifications.” Id. at
324. He advocates for a strengthened double patenting doctrine that would prevent the same inventor or employer
from patenting a species within the scope of that inventor or employer’s existing genus patent. See id. at 350–
76.
225. See LOKELMA, https://www.lokelma-hcp.com (last visited Feb. 4, 2021); Jerome P. Kassirer & Jay B.
Wish, Disorders of Potassium Metabolism, in THERAPY OF RENAL DISEASES AND RELATED DISORDERS 63, 71
(Wadi N. Suki & Shaul G. Massry eds., 2012).
226. New Drug Application (NDA) applicants must submit to FDA information regarding patents claiming
the drug or a method of using it. See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2018). FDA’s publication containing this information,
Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, is better known as the Orange Book. See
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP ’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH
THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS, at iv (40th ed. 2020) [hereinafter APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS
40TH].
227. See APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS 40TH, supra note 226, at ADA 245; U.S. Patent No. 8,877,255, at [21]
(issued from U.S. Application No. 14/060,279); U.S. Patent No. 8,802,152, at [21] (issued from U.S. Application
No. 13/371,080). Thirteen patents were listed in the Orange Book for Lokelma® between its approval and July
2020, but nine of these were continuing applications of other patents also listed. See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
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is likely that U.S. Application No. 14/060,279 (the “supplementary ’279
application”) fell within the supplementation grace period of U.S. Application
No. 13/371,080 (the “original ’080 application”). They had the same owner and
inventors, ZS Pharma, Inc. (which was acquired by AstraZeneca in 2015228) and
Donald Keyser and Alvaro Guillem, respectively,229 and the supplementary ’279
application’s priority date was within one year of the original ’080 application’s
publication.230
The supplementary ’279 application’s claims likely would have been found
unpatentable if not filed within the supplementation grace period. The original
’080 application describes microporous zirconium silicate (“ZS”) compositions
formulated to remove toxins, including potassium ions, from the gastrointestinal
tract without causing undesirable side effects.231 The supplementary ’279
application adds new disclosure, including disclosure regarding compositions
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE
EVALUATIONS—CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT 7 JULY 2020, at A-40 (40th ed. 2020) [hereinafter APPROVED DRUG
PRODUCTS 40TH—CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT]; APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS 40TH, supra note 226, at ADA 245;
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP ’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH
THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS ADA 233 (39th ed. 2019) [hereinafter APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS
39TH]; U.S. Patent No. 10,695,365, at [60] (claiming priority to U.S. Application No. 14/060,279); U.S. Patent
No. 10,413,569, at [60] (claiming priority to U.S. Application No. 13/371,080); U.S. Patent No. 10,398,730, at
[60] (claiming priority to U.S. Application No. 13/371,080); U.S. Patent No. 10,335,432, at [60] (claiming
priority to U.S. Application No. 13/371,080); U.S. Patent No. 10,300,087, at [60] (claiming priority to U.S.
Application No. 14/883,428); U.S. Patent No. 9,913,860, at [60] (claiming priority to U.S. Application No.
14/060,279); U.S. Patent No. 9,861,658, at [60] (claiming priority to U.S. Application No. 13/371,080); U.S.
Patent No. 9,844,567, at [60] (claiming priority to U.S. Application No. 13/371,080); U.S. Patent No. 9,592,253,
at [21] (issued from U.S. Application No. 14/883,428); U.S. Patent No. 8,877,255, at [21] (issued from U.S.
Application No. 14/060,279); U.S. Patent No. 8,808,750, at [60] (claiming priority to U.S. Application No.
13/371,080); U.S. Patent No. 8,802,152, at [21] (issued from U.S. Application No. 13/371,080); U.S. Patent No.
6,332,985, at [21] (issued from U.S. Application No. 09/597,337).
228. AstraZeneca Completes Acquisition of ZS Pharma, ASTRAZENECA (Dec. 17, 2015),
https://www.astrazeneca.com/media-centre/press-releases/2015/AstraZeneca-completes-acquisition-of-ZSPharma-17122015.html.
229. Compare U.S. Patent Application Pub. No. 2012/0213847, at [73], [75], with U.S. Patent Application
Pub. No. 2014/0113002, at [73], [75].
230. Compare ’847 Patent Application Pub., at [43] (published August 23, 2012), with ’002 Patent
Application Pub., at [60] (claiming priority to provisional applications filed on October 22, 2012, and March 15,
2013). The supplementary ’279 application was examined under pre-AIA §§ 102–103 because its claims had
effective filing dates before March 16, 2013. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, § 3(n),
125 Stat. 284, 293 (2011) (specifying that the amendments to §§ 102–103 take effect eighteen months after
enactment); Non-Final Office Action, U.S. Patent Application No. 14/060,279, at 3 (Apr. 3, 2014),
https://portal.uspto.gov/pair/PublicPair (select “Application Number” under “Choose type of number”; then
enter “14/060279” in search box; then click “Search”; then click “Image File Wrapper”; then follow “Non-Final
Rejection” hyperlink) (stating that the claims have an effective filing date of March 15, 2013). Under pre-AIA
§§ 102–03, the ’080 application was not prior art to the ’279 application under § 102(e) because it was not “by
another” (assuming no non-inventors contributed to the disclosure), see supra note 77, and it was not prior art
under § 102(b) because the ’279 application’s effective filing date was within a year of the ’080 application’s
publication. See 35 U.S.C § 102 (2006). The ’279 application thus fell within the supplementation grace period
of the ’080 application as long as the ’080 application was not prior art under § 102(a)—that is, as long as the
invention of the ’279 application’s claimed invention was before the ’080 application’s publication. See id.
Information about the timing of invention is not available in the record.
231. See ’152 Patent, at [57].
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having lower amounts of one form of ZS (“ZS-8”) based on the inventors’
finding that ZS-8 had higher solubility and therefore could undesirably increase
levels of zirconium and silicates in the urine.232
The supplementary ’279 application relies on this additional disclosure to
claim an invention only slightly different from what is described in the original
’080 application. The first claim of the patent issuing from the supplementary
’279 application, U.S. Patent No. 8,877,255, reads:
1. A zirconium silicate composition comprising zirconium silicate of formula
(I):
ApMxZr1-xSinGeyOm
(I)
where
A is a potassium ion, sodium ion, rubidium ion, cesium ion, calcium ion,
magnesium ion, hydronium ion or mixtures thereof,
M is at least one framework metal, wherein the framework metal is hafnium
(4+), tin (4+), niobium (5+), titanium (4+), cerium (4+), germanium
(4+), praseodymium (4+), terbium (4+) or mixtures thereof,
“p” has a value from about 1 to about 20,
“x” has a value from 0 to less than 1,
“n” has a value from 1 to about 12,
“y” has a value from 0 to about 12,
“m” has a value from about 3 to about 36 and 1≦n+y≦12, wherein the
composition comprises ZS-9 and ZS-7 and lacks detectable amounts of
ZS-8.233

Everything in this claim was disclosed in the original ’080 application, with
the exception of the last italicized phrase.234 When ZS Pharma presented a nearly
identical claim in the European counterpart application, where the original ’080
application was prior art, the European examiner stated that the claim did not
involve an inventive step (analogous to nonobviousness235) as compared to the
disclosure in the original ’080 application.236 But in the United States, the patent
232. See ’255 Patent, at cols. 6–7, 36.
233. Id. at col. 37 l. 7–26 (emphasis added).
234. Compare ’152 Patent, at cols. 3, 20, with ’255 Patent, at col. 37.
235. Duffy, supra note 8, at 1–2; Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 56, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065
U.N.T.S. 199 (“An invention shall be considered as involving an inventive step, if having regard to the state of
the art, it is not obvious to a person skilled in the art.”) (emphasis added).
236. See European Search Opinion, European Patent Application No. EP13849651.8, at 1–3, EURO. PAT.
REG. (Feb. 3, 2016), https://register.epo.org/application?number=EP13849651&lng=en&tab=doclist (follow
“European Search Opinion” hyperlink). The applicant argued in response that the inventive step requirement
was met, but it later amended the claims. See Amendments Received Before Examination, European Patent
Application No. EP13849651.8, at 2–3, EURO. PAT. REG. (August 28, 2016), https://register.epo.org/
application?number=EP13849651&lng=en&tab=doclist (follow “Amendments received before examination”
hyperlink); Reply to Communication from the Examining Division, European Patent Application No.
EP13849651.8, at 1, EURO. PAT. REG. (Jan. 8, 2020), https://register.epo.org/application?number=EP13849651
&lng=en&tab=doclist (follow “Reply to communication from the Examining Division” hyperlink). The
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examiner did not use the original ’080 application as prior art in her obviousness
rejection, despite being aware of it.237 The record thus suggests that the
supplementation grace period allowed ZS Pharma to obtain additional patent
coverage for its drug based on post-filing innovation about the specific forms of
ZS that were more desirable.238 And although both the original ’080 and
supplementary ’279 applications resulted in patents that covered the drug
substance,239 the patent examiner did not find the ’279 application’s claims
obvious in view of the ’080 application’s claims. Thus, no obviousness-type
double patenting was found, and no terminal disclaimer was filed.240
a. Patent Term
Without a terminal disclaimer, a supplementary patent’s term can extend
beyond the term of the original patent. The Patent and Copyright Clause of the
Constitution provides that Congress shall have power “[t]o promote the progress
of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors
the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”241 A limit on
patent term reflects the view that monopolies, while permissible to the extent
that they encourage innovation, should not be excessive; a monopoly that
extends too broadly or too long is harmful to social welfare.242 Under current

disclosure of original U.S. Patent Application No. 13/371,080 was prior art against the European application
because European law excludes applications from prior art only until publication (and only for inventive step,
not novelty). See supra note 153.
237. See Non-Final Office Action, U.S. Patent Application No. 14/060,279, at 4–12 (Apr. 3, 2014),
https://portal.uspto.gov/pair/PublicPair (select “Application Number” under “Choose type of number”; then
enter “14/060279” in search box; then click “Search”; then click “Image File Wrapper”; then follow “Non-Final
Rejection” hyperlink) (rejecting the claim under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over patent references to Ash and
Bem et al. and relying on the original ’080 application as evidence of inherent properties disclosed in the Bem
reference); U.S. Patent Application Pub. 2004/0105895, at [76]; U.S. Patent No. 5,891,417, at [75]. Further
evidence that the U.S. examiner did not consider the original ’080 application to be prior art can be found in a
continuation application claiming priority to the supplementary ’279 application, U.S. Patent Application No.
14/628,017. See U.S. Patent Application Pub. No. 2015/0250821, at [63]. There, in examining a nearly identical
claim, the examiner stated that the Bem reference was “arguably the closest prior art.” Non-Final Office Action,
U.S. Patent Application No. 14/628,017, at 4–5 (May 9, 2017), https://portal.uspto.gov/pair/PublicPair (select
“Application Number” under “Choose type of number”; then enter “14/628017” in search box; then click
“Search”; then click “Image File Wrapper”; then follow “Non-Final Rejection” hyperlink).
238. It is not possible to definitively determine whether the ’279 application actually qualified for the
supplementation grace period without knowing the date of invention, which is not available in the record; nor is
it possible to know from the record whether the patent examiner relied on the supplementation grace period
during examination; nor is it possible to know whether the ’279 application’s claims would have been considered
patentable over the ’080 application. Part IV.B.1.c addresses concerns about such lack of public notice. A
detailed analysis of whether the ’279 application’s claims were obvious in view of the ’080 application is beyond
the scope of this Article.
239. See APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS 40TH, supra note 226, at ADA 245.
240. See Transaction History, U.S. Patent Application No. 14/060,279, https://portal.uspto.gov/pair/
PublicPair (last visited Feb. 4, 2021) (select “Application Number” under “Choose type of number”; then enter
“14/060279” in search box; then click “Search”; then click “Transaction History”).
241. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
242. See Price, supra note 173, at 1619.
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law, the term of a patent is twenty years from the application’s filing date,
subject to certain adjustments.243
When Congress dictated the replacement of § 102(g)-based obviousness
with obviousness-type double patenting in 1984, the new safe harbor allowed
original patent applicants additional scope but not longer term.244 But as a result
of the subsequent expansions of the safe harbor, an original applicant can often
receive later-expiring patent protection for post-filing innovation that would be
unpatentable absent preferential treatment. For instance, in the Lokelma®
example, the patent covering the drug resulting from the original ’080
application expires on April 19, 2032; the patent resulting from the
supplementary ’279 application expires a year and a half later, on October 22,
2033.245
b. Common Control
Terminal disclaimers to overcome an obviousness-type double patenting
rejection provide not only that the issuing patent’s term will not extend beyond
the term of the reference patent, but also that the patents are only enforceable if
they remain commonly controlled.246 This forward-looking common control
requirement addresses concerns that patents with similar claims will end up in
the hands of different assignees and result in multiple suits against the same
alleged infringer.247
When supplementary applications become patents without terminal
disclaimers over the original patent, there is no forward-looking restriction on
ownership or control. Eligibility for preferential treatment based on common
control is determined only at a single point in time—under current law, at the

243. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2018); supra note 157 and accompanying text.
244. See supra Part II.B.
245. See APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS 40TH, supra note 226, at ADA 245. ZS Pharma received slightly fewer
additional days than based on the twenty-year term alone, because the earlier-expiring ’152 patent had sixtynine days of patent term adjustment under 35 U.S.C. § 154(b), whereas the later-expiring ’255 patent had none.
Compare U.S. Patent No. 8,802,152, at [*] (filed Feb. 10, 2012), with U.S. Patent No. 8,877,255, at [*] (filed
Oct. 22, 2013). An application for patent term extension under 35 U.S.C. § 156 has been filed in the ’152 patent,
which would extend the term to May 18, 2032. See Application for Extension of Patent Term under 35 U.S.C.
§ 156, U.S. Patent No. 8,802,152, at 11 (July 21, 2018), https://portal.uspto.gov/pair/PublicPair (select “Patent
Number” under “Choose type of number”; then enter “8802152” in search box; then click “Search”; then click
“Image File Wrapper”; then follow “Patent Term Extension Application Under 35 USC 156” hyperlink).
246. When the two patents are commonly owned, the terminal disclaimer must include a provision that the
issuing patent will be enforceable only for and during the period that they are commonly owned. 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.321(c)(3) (2018). When the obvious-type double patenting is a result of the safe harbor for joint research
agreements, the terminal disclaimer must include a provision waiving the right to separately enforce the patents,
and providing that the issuing patent will be enforceable only for and during the period that the patents are not
separately enforced. Id. § 1.321(d)(3).
247. In re Van Ornum, 686 F.2d 937, 944 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (citing DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS § 9.04(2)(b)
(1981)).
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supplementary application’s effective filing date.248 In some cases, the two
applications may in fact never be commonly controlled if the supplementation
grace period is a result of identical inventorship or origination of the original
application’s relevant disclosure from an inventor of the supplementary
application.249
c. Public Notice
The relationships between patent applications typically must be explicitly
stated in the record. This is true when an application claims the benefit of another
application’s earlier filing date, and when a terminal disclaimer is filed.250 But
when a supplementary patent does not have a terminal disclaimer over the
original patent, there is often no indication in the record that the supplementary
patent would be unpatentable but for the supplementation grace period.
In the Lokelma® example above, for instance, there is nothing in the
supplementary ’279 application’s record that links it to the original ’080
application, nor is there anything in the original ’080 application’s record that
links it to the supplementary ’279 application.251 Indeed, it is not possible to
definitively determine from the record whether the ’279 application actually
qualified for the supplementation grace period, whether the patent examiner
relied on the supplementation grace period during examination, or whether the
’279 application’s claims would have been considered patentable over the’080
application had the supplementation grace period not applied. And assuming that
the ’279 application was in fact patentable only as a result of the
supplementation grace period, because there is no such indication in the record,
another innovator aware of the original ’080 application, but not aware of the
supplementary ’279 application, could incorrectly assume that obvious variants
of what was disclosed in the original ’080 application were in the public domain.
Such an assumption would not be unreasonable, since supplementary
applications are an exception to the “fundamental premise” of patent law that

248. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(2)(C), (c)(1) (2018). Pre-AIA § 103(c) similarly assessed eligibility only at a
single point in time (when the supplementary application’s claimed invention was made). See 35 U.S.C. § 103(c)
(2006).
249. See supra Part IV.A.
250. See 35 U.S.C. § 119(e)(1) (2018) (requiring a specific reference to a provisional application); id. § 120
(requiring a specific reference to an earlier-filed nonprovisional application); 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(a) (2018)
(requiring the disclaimer be recorded at the USPTO and stating that a notice of a disclaimer is published in the
Official Gazette and attached to the patent).
251. The prosecution history of a different patent application, however, contains an erroneous statement in
which the supplementary ’279 application is described as a continuation-in-part of the original ’080 application.
See Response to Decision on Petition under 37 C.F.R. § 1.78(c) and (e), U.S. Patent Application No. 14/826,058,
at 2 (Jan. 13, 2017), https://portal.uspto.gov/pair/PublicPair (select “Application Number” under “Choose type
of number”; then enter “14/826058” in search box; then click “Search”; then click “Image File Wrapper”; then
follow “Petition for review by the Office of Petitions” hyperlink). See supra note 31 for a discussion of
continuation-in-part applications.

612

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

“only significant inventions receive patent
improvements remain in the public domain.”252

[Vol. 72:565

protection

while

minor

2. Applicant Control over the Supplementation Grace Period
The AIA also reverses some of the simplification of line-drawing between
favored original patent applicants and others that was established by the reforms
of 1984, 1999, and 2004. The supplementation grace period under the AIA is
created by several layered carve-outs, each drawing the line differently between
original applicants and others in ways that can impact the length of the
supplementation grace period. As such, it is particularly subject to applicant
manipulation.
a. Inventorship and Common Control
Before the AIA, the supplementation grace period for eligible minor
supplementary innovation extended until the original application’s publication
(or issuance when there was no pre-grant publication).253 Pre-AIA law treated
minor supplementary innovation equally whether it was by the same inventor
group, by the same owner, or under a joint research agreement. Difficult linedrawing between original applicants and others was therefore largely eliminated
for minor supplementary innovation within almost all collaborative research
environments.
But the AIA reintroduced a new line-drawing problem by making the
length of the supplementation grace period dependent on inventors and their
contributions, even with common control.254 The AIA framework thus creates
more opportunities and incentives to modify a supplementary application to
make it fall within the supplementation grace period of an original patent
application.
252. Pedraza-Fariña & Whalen, supra note 9, at 63. Occasionally, a supplementary application’s record will
indicate that the applicant is relying on the supplementation grace period; this can happen, for example, when
the USPTO incorrectly rejects a supplementary application over a commonly controlled original application,
and the applicant then makes a statement during examination to remove the original application as prior art. See
MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 135, § 717.02 (describing the procedure “to invoke
common ownership to except a disclosure as prior art”). Even in these instances, however, the link between
applications can be buried in hundreds of pages of correspondence between the applicant and USPTO. For
example, ZS Pharma relied on the supplementation grace period in another application, U.S. Application No.
14/536,056. There, the patent examiner rejected the application as obvious over the ’279 application. See NonFinal Office Action, U.S. Patent Application No. 14/536,056, at 5 (Sept. 13, 2016), https://portal.uspto.gov/
pair/PublicPair (select “Application Number” under “Choose type of number”; then enter “14/536056” in search
box; then click “Search”; then click “Image File Wrapper”; then follow “Non-Final Rejection” hyperlink); U.S.
Patent Application Pub. No. 2014/0113002, at [21]. In response, ZS Pharma made a statement of common
ownership to remove the ’279 application as prior art. See Petition for Extension of Time, Amendment and
Response to Non-Final Office Action, U.S. Patent Application No. 14/536,056, at 13 (Mar. 13, 2017),
https://portal.uspto.gov/pair/PublicPair (select “Application Number” under “Choose type of number”; then
enter “14/536056” in search box; then click “Search”; then click “Image File Wrapper”; then follow “Applicant
Arguments/Remarks Made in an Amendment” hyperlink dated Mar. 23, 2017).
253. See supra notes 147–148 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 149–150, 213–217 and accompanying text.
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For example, by adding an inventor to the supplementary application such
that the relevant disclosure in the original application originates from an inventor
of the supplementary application, a patent applicant can add a year to the
supplementation grace period.255 Adding such an inventor is often within the
applicant’s control. Inventorship is based on an application’s claims, and small
changes to the claims can allow an applicant to add or remove an inventor.256
Indeed, practitioners recommend this strategy for patenting supplementary
innovation.257
Applicants can also use ownership and joint research agreements to control
which supplementary innovation is patentable. Since the common-control safe
harbor developed to accommodate collaborative research,258 this is largely
unproblematic. Yet the AIA departs from the original goal because the relevant
date for assessing common control is the supplementary application’s date of
filing, not its date of invention (as it was pre-AIA).259
An applicant can therefore purchase certain earlier-filed applications
before filing a new application (but after inventing its claimed invention) in
order to remove the earlier-filed application as prior art.260 An applicant can
similarly enter into a joint research agreement to remove certain earlier-filed
applications owned by parties to the agreement, as long as the agreement is in
effect by the new application’s filing date (even if it was not in effect at the time
of invention). This requires only that the new application is developed as part of
the joint research agreement; the applications removed as prior art do not need
to result from work under the agreement.261 Thus, original and supplementary
applications can be based on completely independent work.262
255. See supra notes 213–216 and accompanying text.
256. Cf. 35 U.S.C. § 116 (2018) (“Inventors may apply for a patent jointly even though . . . each did not
make a contribution to . . . every claim.”); 37 C.F.R. § 1.48 (2018) (describing the procedures for correcting or
changing inventorship, for example to due to “cancelation of claims in the application”); Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S.
Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“A contribution to one claim is enough.”).
257. See, e.g., Michael K. Henry, How to Avoid Your Own Patents and Applications as Prior Art Under the
America Invents Act (AIA), HENRY PATENT L. FIRM (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.henrypatentfirm.com/
blog/prior-art-under-aia. Pre-AIA law created some incentives to manipulate inventorship for deepening
supplementary innovation. Original patent applicants could create a supplementation grace period for deepening
supplementary innovation by adding inventors to the supplementary application such that the disclosure in the
original application was not “by another.” This would remove the original application’s disclosure as prior art
under § 102(e). See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006); Lewis et al., supra note 62, at 83; TERRI SHIEH-NEWTON, MINTZ
LEVIN IP SUMMER ACADEMY 2016, HOW TO OVERCOME REJECTIONS UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 102, at 48, 59–60
(2016), https://www.mintz.com/newsletter/2016/Documents/IPSA2016/IPSA%20Presentations/Week%201/
IPSA2016%20Week%201%20All%20Presentations.pdf.
258. See supra Part II.B, II.C.
259. See supra notes 143–145 and accompanying text.
260. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(2)(C) (2018); MaCharri Vorndran-Jones, Donna M. Meuth, Tom Irving,
Deborah Herzfeld & Stacy Lewis, Top Five Dangers for the AIA Unwary, 5 LANDSLIDE 10, 11–12 (2013).
261. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(c)(1)–(3); Matal, supra note 118, at 487; Vorndran-Jones et al., supra note 260,
at 11; Dennis Crouch, The New Law Effective Today: 35 U.S.C. 102, PATENTLY -O (Mar. 16, 2013),
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2013/03/the-new-law-effective-today-35-usc-102.html.
262. But in circumstances where the supplementation grace period would end with publication, a purchase
or formation of a joint research agreement for the purpose of removing earlier-filed applications as prior art
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b. Publication
Applicants can also influence the supplementation grace period’s length
through the original application’s publication. As Part II.C.2 described, the 1999
AIPA tied the supplementation grace period to publication, and this feature is
maintained under the AIA. Under 35 U.S.C. § 122, a patent application is
generally published eighteen months from its priority date.263 But an applicant
may choose to keep its application secret until grant if no corresponding foreign
or international application is filed that will publish at eighteen months.264 An
applicant can thus substantially lengthen its supplementation grace period by
requesting nonpublication, and some practitioners specifically recommend this
strategy for patenting supplementary innovation.265
C. AN OWN PRIOR APPLICATION DISCLAIMER
Instead of the current complex and haphazardly developed statutory
framework, the Subparts that follow suggest an alternative approach to
preferential treatment. This alternative approach would address the problems
outlined above and simplify the statutory framework such that its parameters
could be more directly tailored to policy goals. In particular, 35 U.S.C. § 102
would be amended to eliminate the carve-outs that create preferential treatment
for original applicants. This would clear away the layered statutory provisions
that have accumulated piecemeal over time, and would give original applicants’
earlier-filed applications the same prior art effect as others’ earlier-filed
applications.266

would presumably require the applicant of the intended supplementary application to know about the original
application while it was still secret, suggesting some prior relationship between the parties.
263. See 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1).
264. Id. § 122(b)(2)(B)(i). A study of U.S. applications that ultimately became patents found that 7.5% of
applications filed between 2001 and 2005 took advantage of § 122(b)(2)(B)(i)’s pre-grant secrecy provision. See
Graham & Hegde, supra note 132, at 5. Even if an applicant may not or does not file a nonpublication request,
it can take other steps to delay publication. For example, filing an incomplete application can delay publication
slightly. Cf. MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 135, § 710.02(d) (describing that the
period for reply to a Notice to File Missing Parts of an application can be extended by up to five months).
265. See CARLYN BURTON, OSHA LIANG LLP, TIMING IS EVERYTHING: WHEN TO FILE A PATENT
APPLICATION 9 (2010); cf. Crouch, supra note 145 (“Theoretically, the exception [of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(2)(C)]
favors . . . applicants who file applications under non-publication requests.”); Patent Application Publication,
NEUSTEL ATT’YS AT L., https://www.neustel.com/patents/patent-applications/patent-application-publication
(last visited Feb. 4, 2021) (describing as a reason for a nonpublication request that “[i]f you abandon this patent
application and it is not published, the patent application cannot be used as prior art by the U.S. Patent Office to
reject a later filed patent application by you for a related invention”). Prior to the institution of pre-grant
publication, it was similarly possible to lengthen the supplementation grace period by invoking strategies to
delay issuance (thus requiring that the patentee delay the start of its patent rights). Under the pre-grant
publication regime, however, delaying or avoiding pre-grant publication has no direct effect on the timing of
patent issuance.
266. More specifically, the amendments would make original patent applicants’ earlier-filed applications
retroactively eligible as prior art as of their effective filing date upon publication or grant. To accomplish this,
the amendments would remove the language “names another inventor” from § 102(a)(2) and eliminate the carveouts for disclosures originating from an inventor and for commonly controlled applications. This would render
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Further statutory amendments would then allow an original applicant to
remove its earlier-filed application(s) as prior art—and thus obtain a
supplementary patent despite its unpatentability over the prior art original
application—by making certain concessions.267 These concessions would limit
the rights created by the supplementary patent and include (1) disclaiming patent
term beyond that available from the original patent application; (2) maintaining
common control over the original and supplementary applications and any
resulting patents; and (3) providing clear public notice of the relationship
between the original and supplementary applications. These concessions would
be made via what this Article terms an “own prior application disclaimer”
(“OPA disclaimer”). OPA disclaimers would complement existing terminal
disclaimers for obviousness-type double patenting.
1. Disclaimed Term
An OPA disclaimer would disclaim patent term beyond that of a patent
issuing from the original patent application. Like terminal disclaimers filed in
response to obviousness-type double patenting (“ODP disclaimers”), OPA
disclaimers would rely on 35 U.S.C. § 253(b), which permits an applicant to
“disclaim or dedicate to the public the entire term, or any terminal part of the
term, of the patent granted or to be granted.”268 Because patent terms are
calculated as a time period (generally twenty years) from filing,269 filing an OPA
disclaimer would result in the supplementary patent’s expiration date being
calculated from the filing date of the original application, rather than from the
filing date of the supplementary application.270 This is consistent with
Congress’s initial expectation that expanded preferential treatment for original
patent applicants would not result in lengthened patent terms.271
An OPA disclaimer would limit the term of a patent issuing from the
supplementary application whether or not the original application matured into
a patent. This is a key distinction from an ODP disclaimer. An ODP disclaimer
gives up the portion of the term of one patent that extends beyond the term of
another patent. Although an ODP disclaimer can be filed over a pending
application,272 if the application never matures into a patent there can be no
double patenting, and no term need be disclaimed. The effect of OPA

published applications and granted patents § 102(a)(2) art, regardless of inventorship, origination of disclosure,
or control.
267. The supplementary patent would be granted (subject to any other prior art) despite its unpatentability
over the original U.S. patent application and any other publications of the same patent disclosure (that is,
continuation or divisional applications and international or foreign counterparts).
268. 35 U.S.C. § 253(b) (2018); In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 894 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
269. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a); supra note 157 and accompanying text.
270. The supplementary patent’s term could still be extended by patent term “adjustment” to account for
delays within the USPTO and/or “extension” to account for premarket regulatory review, and/or shortened by
ODP disclaimer(s). See 35 U.S.C. § 154(b) (patent term adjustment); id. § 156 (patent term extension).
271. See supra Parts II.B, II.C, IV.B.1.
272. See MANUAL OF PATENT E XAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 135, § 804(I)(B).
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disclaimers could not be limited in this way; if it were, an original patent
applicant could shift its patent term later by serially filing and abandoning
applications if no intervening prior art existed.
Disclaimers of term would have varying effects on supplementary patents’
incentive function depending on the type of supplementary innovation (as
discussed further in Part IV.C.4) and depending on the commercial significance
of the end portion of patent term. In industries with short product cycles, the end
portion of patent term may have little practical significance. In industries with
long product life cycles like the pharmaceutical industry,273 on the other hand,
each day at the end of a patent’s term can be very valuable. For blockbuster
drugs, extending patent term by a matter of months can lead to hundreds of
millions of dollars of additional profits.274
2. Common Control
The current framework for preferential treatment leaves open the
possibility that original and supplementary applications are separately controlled
and enforced. OPA disclaimers would, like ODP disclaimers, provide a
mechanism for placing forward-looking restrictions on their control.275 That is,
OPA disclaimers could require that original and supplementary applications
remain commonly controlled in order for the patents to be enforceable and that
the owner(s) waive the right to separately enforce any patents issuing from the
original and supplementary applications. Such restrictions cannot be workably
implemented under the current system.276
Ensuring that original and supplementary applications and patents are
commonly controlled at licensing and enforcement reduces preferential
treatment’s potential to hamper innovation by others. In particular, it mitigates
the risk of alleged infringers facing multiple suits, and of potential licensees
needing to negotiate with multiple potential licensors.277

273. See Henry Grabowski, Patents and New Product Development in the Pharmaceutical and
Biotechnology Industries, 8 GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV. 7, 8 (2003) (comparing product life cycles between the
pharmaceutical industry and other industries, and describing that “R&D investment periods and product life
cycles are typically much shorter in” industries “such as computer technologies, scientific instruments, and
semiconductors”).
274. Feldman, supra note 40, at 601. But drugs with secondary patents that extend the effective patent terms
are more likely to attract generic challenges. See C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, When Do Generics
Challenge Drug Patents?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 613, 635 (2011). If supplementary patents that extend
effective patent term are likely to be found invalid based on the primary patent (or an earlier secondary patent),
an ODP disclaimer’s actual impact on effective term might be less than suggested on its face.
275. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 143, 248 and accompanying text.
277. Cf. Cotropia, supra note 9, at 1525 (noting that different patentees holding rights “on small technical
advances make it extremely difficult and ‘expensive to search and to license’ these patents in order to produce
further innovations”) (citing FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION ch. 4, at 3 (2003)).
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3. Public Notice
The current system also usually provides no indication in the record of the
relationship between the original and supplementary applications.278 Under an
OPA disclaimer system, the original patent applicant would need to file an OPA
disclaimer with the USPTO, rather than an exception applying automatically as
under current law. OPA disclaimers would thus provide a mechanism for making
information about the relationship between the applications easily available to
the public. For example, like an ODP disclaimer, an OPA disclaimer could be
indicated on a patent’s face and in the USPTO’s public application database.279
Applicants could be required to file any OPA disclaimer with the USPTO within
a short period after filing the supplementary application, similar to requirements
for claims of priority to earlier-filed applications.280
OPA disclaimers would thus substantially improve public notice as to the
potential scope and duration of rights available to the original patent applicant.
In particular, an indication on the face of the original application’s pre-grant
publication or resulting patent would serve as a warning to other innovators who
might incorrectly assume that obvious variants were in the public domain. And
by helping others identify and understand the relationships within a patent
portfolio, an indication in each application’s record would reduce supplementary
applications’ contribution to patent thickets.281
4. Eligibility for Preferential Treatment
The statutory amendments would also need to define the eligibility criteria
for preferential treatment. These include (1) who is eligible for preferential

278. See supra Part IV.B.1.c.
279. See Quick Guide to Locating Patent Term Information on the USPTO Web Site, USPTO,
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/patents/law/How_to_Locate_Patent_Term_Information.docx
(last
visited Feb. 4, 2021) (pages 7–8). OPA disclaimers would ideally appear (unlike ODP disclaimers) in the
database entries for both the original and supplementary applications and any of their children, on the face of
both applications’ pre-grant publications and resulting patents, and on the face of both applications’ children’s
pre-grant publications and resulting patents.
280. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.78(a)(4) (2018). ODP disclaimers, in contrast, can be filed during an application’s
pendency or after issuance (but not after expiration of the reference patent). See Boehringer Ingelheim Int’l
GmbH v. Barr Labs., Inc., 592 F.3d 1340, 1347–48 (Fed. Cir. 2010). ODP disclaimers can even be filed during
litigation in response to a finding of invalidity due to obviousness-type double patenting. Id. at 1347; Jeffrey I.
D. Lewis, Curing Double Patenting During Prosecution and After Issuance: When Once Is Never Enough and
Twice Is Too Much, 21 AIPLA Q. J. 34, 48–50 (1993).
Because applicants can pursue a series of continuing applications off of a parent application to form a
patent family, see 35 U.S.C. § 120 (2018); Chiang, supra note 3, at 533–34; Lemley & Moore, supra note 180,
any OPA disclaimer would need to be filed in the first nonprovisional application in a family. The OPA
disclaimer would then also apply to any later applications claiming priority to the first application. Otherwise,
applicants could file OPA disclaimers in some family members but not others, effectively eliminating the public
notice function.
281. Preferential treatment encourages innovators to file patent applications that they would not otherwise
file, see supra Part III.A.1, potentially contributing to large patent portfolios. Large patent portfolios, in turn,
can contribute to patent thickets that are difficult for others to navigate. See Day & Schuster, supra note 41, at
127–30; Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 7, at 62–64.

618

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 72:565

treatment; (2) when preferential treatment is available; and (3) what type of
supplementary innovation is eligible. Each of these received piecemeal, if any,
attention during the historical development of preferential treatment for original
patent applicants.
a. Who Is Eligible
Of these criteria, who is eligible for preferential treatment—that is, how to
define an “original patent applicant”—received the most attention historically.
The CCPA struggled with drawing the line between favored original patent
applicants and others in the 1960s, and Congress has since shifted the line toward
expanded eligibility, first to include whole organizations, then to include
collaborative teams across organizations.282 The AIA defines who is eligible by
three layered criteria: common control, identical inventorship, and origination
of the original disclosure from an inventor of the supplementary application.283
An OPA disclaimer’s ongoing common control requirement would create
the most important constraint regarding who is eligible for preferential
treatment. As described above, requiring ongoing common control would
mitigate some of the key ways that supplementary applications can hamper
innovation by others.284 It would also make preferential treatment more
consistent with theoretical justifications for nonobviousness by eliminating the
requirement (along with novelty) when allocation of rewards between parties is
not needed.285
Additional eligibility requirements beyond common control depend on
policy goals. If, consistent with its historical development, the primary goal of
preferential treatment is to accommodate the difficulty of mapping complex,
collaborative research and development to the patent system, an ongoing
common control requirement alone would award preferential treatment to too
much supplementary innovation. Common control, especially based on common
ownership by large or decentralized institutions, such as universities, may not
reflect any collaboration.286
Requiring common control in combination with knowledge transfer
between innovators involved in the original and supplementary innovation
would better tailor preferential treatment to collaborative work, but documenting
knowledge transfer could impose substantial burdens on patent applicants.
Relying on origination of the original application’s relevant disclosure from an
inventor of the supplementary innovation is a reasonable, if not perfect, proxy
282. See supra Part II.B, II.C.
283. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2018); supra Part IV.A.
284. See supra Part IV.C.2.
285. See supra notes 9–13 and accompanying text; cf. Duffy, supra note 8, at 14–16 (describing, with respect
to pre-AIA law, that the nonobviousness requirement serves to allocate rewards among inventors, but that when
there is common ownership between these applications, “allocating rewards among parties is not a concern,” so
the “law thus eliminates the nonobviousness requirement in those circumstances”).
286. Cf. Crouch, supra note 261, at n.7 (“Large companies who file many patent applications receive
additional relief from their own prior art . . . .”).
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for actual knowledge transfer between innovators. Opportunities for
manipulating eligibility via inventorship could be reduced by assessing
eligibility on a claim-by-claim basis in the supplementary application, rather
than based on the inventorship of the supplementary application as a whole.287
If, however, the primary goal of preferential treatment is to increase
disclosure and innovation incentives for supplementary innovation, rather than
to reflect collaborative work, additional requirements beyond common control
may be unnecessary. Allowing companies to purchase original patent
applications to gain preferential treatment, for example, would allow
redistribution of these incentives to entities valuing exclusivity as to
supplementary innovation higher than the original applicants.
b. When Preferential Treatment Is Available
Another important consideration is when preferential treatment is
available—that is, the length of the supplementation grace period. The temporal
boundaries of preferential treatment received little attention historically, even
while undergoing significant changes with the passage of the AIPA and AIA.288
A supplementation grace period of zero would eliminate preferential
treatment; a supplementation grace period of infinite duration would allow an
original applicant to patent supplementary innovation occurring at any time
(subject to any other prior art). Between these extremes, supplementation grace
periods could be set by duration (for example, months from the original
application’s filing), by original application status (for example, publication or
issuance), or by a non-patent event (for example, regulatory approval, sale of a
product, licensing, assignment, or enforcement). They could also be set by a
combination of these approaches, as under the AIA, where the supplementation
grace period ends with the original application’s publication or a year
thereafter.289
Even if the supplementation grace period were infinite, an effective
temporal limit would often be formed by the original applicant’s own non-patent
prior art. The original applicant can create prior art against its own
supplementary application through a printed publication, public use, sale, or
other public disclosure more than a year before the supplementary application is
filed.290 The OPA disclaimer proposed here would not have any effect on non-

287. Because the OPA disclaimer would be ineffective for ineligible claims, the content of the prior art
could vary by claim. This can also occur when a patent application claims priority to a provisional application
or is a continuation-in-part. In these cases, the effective filing date (and thus the content of the prior art) is
determined individually for each claim. See Lucent Tech., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 543 F.3d 710, 718 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
288. See supra Part II.C.2, II.D.
289. See supra Parts II.D, IV.A.
290. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2018) (setting forth sources of prior art); id. § 102(b)(1)(A) (setting forth a
one-year grace period for disclosures by an inventor).
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patent prior art. These other forms of the original applicants’ own prior art could
thus generate an effective end date for the supplementation grace period.291
Setting aside these limits created by other forms of own prior art, the most
notable effects of the supplementation grace period’s length are on the scope of
exclusivity for original patent applicants, on the timing of public notice
regarding that exclusivity, and on how original patent applicants allocate their
resources.
A longer supplementation grace period increases the chance that an original
patent applicant will invent supplementary innovation in time to patent it.
Moreover, a longer supplementation grace period changes what post-filing
innovation an original applicant can patent as a result of preferential treatment.
Nonobviousness is assessed as of the supplementary application’s filing; when
this date is later, the scope of follow-on innovation that is obvious in view of
other technological developments since the original application may be
broader.292 The boundary between unpatentable and patentable innovation thus
shifts over time. Follow-on innovation that is initially patentable in view of an
original application, and thus equally subject to patent exclusivity by the original
applicant and others, may later be unpatentable, and thus subject to patent
exclusivity only by the favored original applicant. A longer supplementation
grace period allows for more shifting of this boundary.
A longer supplementation grace period thus increases uncertainty for the
public regarding an original patent applicant’s ultimate scope of exclusivity. It
delays public notice as to how much of the potential scope of exclusivity the
original applicant has actually attempted to capture through supplementary
applications, while also increasing uncertainty as to the boundary of that
potential scope. Longer supplementation grace periods also have the potential to
change innovation incentives for original patent applicants by encouraging them
to direct resources toward supplementary innovation, rather than other
innovation, for longer.293
The supplementation grace period’s length can have other effects as well.
For example, longer supplementation grace periods are likely to result in more
291. See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text for discussion of a few examples of these forms of prior
art. For more discussion of non-patent own prior art before and after the AIA, see, for example, Phillip W. Goter,
The Commercial Exploitation Continuum, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 795 (2012); Dmitry Karshtedt, Did
Learned Hand Get It Wrong?: The Questionable Patent Forfeiture Rule of Metallizing Engineering, 57 VILL. L.
REV. 261 (2012); Lemley, supra note 65; Mark Levy, An Analysis of the On Sale Bar and Its Impact on the
Structure and Negotiation of Development Agreements, 30 U. DAYTON L. REV. 181 (2004); Shashank Upadhye,
To Use or Not to Use: Reforming Patent Infringement, the Public Use Bar, and the Experimental Use Doctrine
as Applied to Clinical Testing of Pharmaceutical and Medical Device Invention, 4 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1
(2002); John C. Williams, Note, Giving Meaning to “Otherwise Available to the Public”: How Helsinn
Perpetuates a Version of the On-Sale Bar to Patentability that Disproportionately Burdens Small Inventors, 97
TEX. L. REV. 421 (2018).
292. Cf. Holbrook, supra note 2, at 1474–75 (“[B]ecause the knowledge of the PHOSITA expands over
time, the nature of the prior art teaching also changes.”).
293. Cf. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 9, at 609 (“[G]ranting patents to obvious developments may
compromise the incentives that the patent system provides to develop nonobvious inventions.”).
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new applications than shorter ones. Increased numbers of applications and
issued patents may be more difficult for others to navigate, even if the original
and supplementary applications are commonly controlled and publicly disclosed
as this Article proposes. Scholars have also suggested that high volumes of
patent applications overload the USPTO and contribute to poor quality
examination, leading to more invalid patents.294 On the other hand, because
supplementation grace periods may decrease pressure on applicants to try to
capture post-filing innovation through original patent applications,295 at least
some supplementary applications may replace continuing applications.
These effects mean that supplementation grace periods cannot be
lengthened without some costs. Yet, there are good reasons to consider coupling
the supplementation grace period’s end to patent issuance (as it was before the
AIPA instituted pre-grant publication), rather than to patent application
publication.296 In such a system, a supplementary application could be filed any
time during the original application’s pendency. Once the original application
matured into a granted patent or went abandoned after publication, the
supplementation grace period would close.297
This approach would eliminate the largely arbitrary difference in
supplementation grace periods between original applications that undergo pregrant publication and those that do not. Coupling the supplementation grace
period’s end to patent issuance is also appealing because issuance marks the start
of enforceable patent rights.298 Original applicants would be able to extend the
supplementation grace period by delaying issuance of the original patent.299 But
unlike extending the supplementation grace period by delaying or opting out of
pre-grant publication, delaying issuance requires the original applicant to make
a potentially meaningful sacrifice by giving up a beginning portion of its
exclusivity.300 The appeal of trading exclusivity for an extended
294. See Cotropia, supra note 6, at 104–05; Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s
Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 46–47 (2007).
295. See supra Part III.A.2.
296. This approach would lengthen the supplementation grace period in most cases. See supra notes 131–
133.
297. If the original application went abandoned without publication, it would never become prior art. See
35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2018). There is a small window in which an application could go abandoned before
publication, yet still publish. Cf. 37 C.F.R. § 1.138(c) (2018) (describing that a petition for express abandonment
to avoid publication should be received by the USPTO more than four weeks before the projected publication
date to provide sufficient time to remove the application from the publication process).
298. But see 35 U.S.C. § 154(d) (creating provisional rights beginning with application publication, if the
invention claimed in the published application is “substantially identical” to the invention ultimately claimed in
the granted patent).
299. An applicant can use various tactics to delay issuance, such as taking extensions of time, filing requests
for continued examination, requesting suspension of action, and abandoning pending applications in favor of
continuing applications. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136 (extensions of time); id. § 1.114 (requests for continued
examination); id. § 1.103 (suspension of action); 35 U.S.C. § 120 (continuing applications). The USPTO fees
associated with these methods of delay could be significant in the aggregate. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.17.
300. Some strategies for delaying issuance could also result in an original applicant giving up an end portion
of its exclusivity. Patent term adjustment can be added onto a patent’s twenty-year term for USPTO’s delays
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supplementation grace period would likely vary by industry. In the
pharmaceutical industry, where an initial patent filing is usually many years
before product launch,301 applicants might value the beginning portion of their
exclusivity less than the ability to patent more supplementary innovation.302 In
other industries where product cycles are shorter, such as the electronics
industry,303 applicants might be more likely to value earlier exclusivity over a
longer supplementation grace period.
A key critique of coupling the end of the supplementation grace period to
issuance rather than to pre-grant publication is that preferential treatment for
original patent applicants has historically been an exception to “secret” prior
art.304 As such, the supplementation grace period’s duration has been tied to
public availability of the original patent application. Lengthening the
supplementation grace period to extend more than a year beyond the original
application’s publication would thus be a significant departure from historical
precedent, in that it would allow original patent applicants to patent innovation
that was unpatentable as compared to information that had been publicly
available for a substantial period of time.305
Although it would depart from precedent, allowing supplementary
applications over publicly available original applications is not inconsistent with
the broader theoretical justifications for treating an applicant’s own public
disclosures as prior art. Inventors are typically barred from patenting an
invention more than a year after it has been available to the public because
“inventions that the public reasonably has come to believe are freely available”
should not be removed from the public domain.306 This justification makes sense
for disclosures such as those via academic publications, sales of a product, or
during prosecution, see 35 U.S.C. § 154(b), but USPTO delays are offset by delays attributable to the applicant.
See Stephanie Plamondon Bair, Adjustments, Extensions, Disclaimers, and Continuations: When Do Patent
Term Adjustments Make Sense?, 41 CAP. U. L. REV. 445, 454–55 (2013).
301. See Grabowski, supra note 273, at 11; Roin, supra note 18, at 529.
302. On the other hand, patent applicants in the pharmaceutical industry are careful to accumulate as much
patent term adjustment as possible, so strategies to delay patent issuance that would decrease patent term
adjustment would be undesirable. See supra note 300.
303. Cf. Grabowski, supra note 273, at 8 (describing that “R&D investment periods and product life cycles
are typically much shorter in” industries “such as computer technologies, scientific instruments, and
semiconductors”).
304. See supra Part II; supra note 18.
305. A detailed analysis of constitutional considerations in patentability is beyond the scope of this Article,
but it is worth noting that a (likely very weak) constitutional challenge to this change might be based on the
Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution’s role as “both a grant of power and a limitation.” Graham v.
John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966). Congress may not “enlarge the patent monopoly without regard to the
innovation, advancement or social benefit gained thereby” or “authorize the issuance of patents whose effects
are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already
available.” Id. at 6; see also Roin, supra note 18, at 557 (suggesting that “carv[ing] out an exemption in the
novelty and nonobviousness standards for drugs . . . . could even be considered unconstitutional under current
Supreme Court precedent”); Seymore, supra note 62, at 1068 n.310 (“Commentators agree that novelty is a
constitutional requirement. Nonobviousness has constitutional underpinnings in that some standard of creativity
might be needed to support patentability.”) (citations omitted).
306. Delano Farms Co. v. Cal. Table Grape Comm’n, 778 F.3d 1243, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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trade show displays, where there is no clear signal to the public of patent rights.
But during the original application’s pendency, the public cannot reasonably rely
on the availability of the innovation it discloses. Indeed, the assumption should
be exactly the opposite—that the innovation may end up the subject of exclusive
rights and therefore is not available to the public. Public reliance becomes
reasonable only when the original patent application and any continuing
applications are no longer pending, and therefore the complete set of rights are
defined.307 This justification is thus particularly tenuous for encompassed
supplementary innovation, which falls entirely within the scope of patentable
claims of the original application.
c. What Type of Supplementary Innovation Is Eligible
Under the current framework, the patentability of supplementary
innovation does not depend on the nature of the innovation itself—that is, no
distinction is made between minor and deepening supplementary innovation,
encompassed and broadening supplementary innovation, or no-fault and at-fault
supplementary innovation. It may be best to maintain this approach under an
OPA disclaimer system; introducing distinctions would significantly increase
the system’s complexity. While line-drawing between minor and deepening
supplementary innovation would be relatively straightforward and finds
precedent in pre-AIA law,308 line-drawing between encompassed and
broadening supplementary innovation, and between no-fault and at-fault
supplementary innovation, would be substantially more complex. That said,
these types of supplementary innovation involve different considerations. It is
thus worth briefly noting how these considerations could be used to tailor an
OPA system more closely to policy goals.
One key consideration, for example, is the difference in effect of
disclaiming patent term on disclosure and innovation incentives for
encompassed versus broadening supplementary patents. As Part III described,
under the current system, patents on broadening supplementary innovation offer
additional term and scope, whereas patents on encompassed supplementary
innovation offer only additional term.309 The OPA disclaimers proposed here
would restrict any additional term from supplementary patents. Broadening
supplementary patents would thus offer only additional scope; encompassed
supplementary patents would offer neither additional scope nor term.310 This
outcome is consistent with a system of preferential treatment focused on
accommodating complex and collaborative research. If, however, maintaining
significant patent-based disclosure and innovation incentives for all
supplementary innovation is a primary policy goal, a modified OPA disclaimer
307. Even then, it is possible for the patentee to change the scope of its claims. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 251
(2018) (providing for reissue of “defective” patents).
308. See supra Part II.A, II.C.
309. See supra notes 157–159 and accompanying text.
310. But even without additional scope or term, encompassed supplementary patents can have value for
original applicants. See supra note 198.
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system could require a disclaimer of term only for broadening supplementary
patents. For encompassed supplementary patents, only ongoing common control
and public notice would be required. Preferential treatment would thus offer
scope but not term for broadening supplementary innovation, and term but not
scope for encompassed supplementary innovation.
The distinctions between broadening and encompassed supplementary
applications also suggest other differences in how preferential treatment could
be structured. For example, concerns associated with longer supplementation
grace periods regarding expanded boundaries and delayed public notice of
potential or actual exclusivity are more salient for broadening supplementary
applications. If these concerns were of particular policy importance, the
supplementation grace period could be extended to issuance only for
encompassed supplementary innovation; for broadening supplementary
innovation, the end of the grace period could continue to be coupled to pre-grant
publication.311
No-fault and at-fault supplementary innovation also present distinct
considerations. It could be desirable to restrict patents on at-fault supplementary
innovation to discourage applicants from using supplementary applications to
correct their own avoidable errors in earlier-filed applications. For example, an
OPA disclaimer could be rendered ineffective if an original patent applicant
were found to be at fault for the post-filing innovation’s unpatentability. The
original application would therefore be prior art to the supplementary
application, making the supplementary application unpatentable. Clear linedrawing between no-fault and at-fault supplementary innovation would be
challenging, but as one example, if claims of an original patent were invalidated
in litigation for lacking utility, the original patent’s disclosure of the subject
matter of those claims would be prior art against the supplementary application,
notwithstanding any OPA disclaimer. This would discourage applicants from
filing original applications too early in reliance on supplementary
applications.312

CONCLUSION
The difficulty of mapping research and development to the patent system,
and the accompanying risk that innovators will render their own work
unpatentable, play an important role in shaping innovators’ patent strategies.313
311. There is precedent for differing time periods for changes to patent rights based on how the changes
affect scope. Patents can be reissued when they are “through error, deemed wholly or partly inoperative or
invalid, by reason of a defective specification or drawing, or by reason of the patentee claiming more or less
than he had a right to claim in the patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 251(a) (2018). The reissued claims can be broader than
the original ones, but only if the reissue application is filed within two years of the original patent’s grant. See
id. § 251(d).
312. See supra notes 175–176 and accompanying text.
313. See, e.g., Charles J. Andres & Richard L. Treanor, Patents in Drug Discovery: Case Studies, Examples,
and Simple Steps Medicinal Chemists Can Take to Protect Hard-Won Intellectual Property, in 45 ANNUAL
REPORTS IN MEDICINAL CHEMISTRY 449, 458 (John E. Macor ed., 2010); Maria Souleau, Legal Aspects of
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Preferential treatment allowing original applicants to patent unpatentable
follow-on innovation is one way that the patent system has adapted to this
difficulty. Yet the practice of filing supplementary applications,314 the historical
development and scope of preferential treatment for original applicants, and the
theory behind it, are mostly overlooked by scholars.315
This Article examines these issues and suggests a reform of the statutory
framework. The reform would alter only a part of patent law’s incredibly
complex prior art ecosystem. This Article has addressed other ways that
applicants create their own prior art, such as journal publications, presentations
at conferences or trade shows, clinical trials, and sales, only in passing, but these,
too, play an important role in applicants’ strategies for mapping dynamic
innovation to the patent system. This Article has also touched only very briefly
on international considerations. Innovation and patent strategy often happen on
a global scale, so U.S. patent law, while a very significant component, is far from
the whole picture. Unilateral changes to U.S. law may ultimately have only
limited impact. Despite these limitations, this Article takes an important step
toward understanding how dynamic innovation processes are mapped to the
patent system and how the treatment of applicants’ own prior art affects
disclosure and innovation.

Product Protection: What a Medicinal Chemist Should Know About Patent Protection, in THE PRACTICE OF
MEDICINAL CHEMISTRY 878, 892 (Camille Georges Wermuth ed., 3d ed. 2008); Henry, supra note 257; Perkins
Coie, Beware of the CIP—Parent Applications Can Be Prior Art, JD SUPRA (Aug. 26, 2014),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/beware-of-the-cipparent-applications-ca-63798/.
314. For examples of practitioners recommending it, see Henry, supra note 257; Christina Sperry & Inna
Dahlin, Does the AIA Have a Prior Art Exception You Can Use?, MINTZ (Apr. 21, 2015),
https://www.globalipmatters.com/2015/04/21/does-the-aia-have-a-prior-art-exception-you-can-use; cf. Perkins
Coie, supra note 313 (describing a similar strategy for continuation-in-part applications).
315. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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